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ABSTRACT
Justice and Economic Theory
May, 1980
Barry Stewart Clark, B.A.
,
Ohio University
M.S., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor Herbert Gintis
The purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the works of past
economic theorists in light of the perspective offered by John Rawls'
A Theory of Justice . The fundamental task of liberal social theory is
claimed to be the legitimation of a society based on private property
and the maximum feasible range of individual liberties. This legitima-
tion must be grounded in the consent of individuals, and yet, if contin-
gency is to be avoided, an objective criterion of right must be formu-
lated in order to determine that to which consent should be given. The
objective criterion provides a basis for assessing the justice of society,
but its viability depends on its ability to generate the consent of the
individuals constituting a given society. Thus the major liberal theor-
ists have sought to construct syntheses of rational and empirical criteria
of right.
In the work of Locke, natural law provides the objective criterion
to which rational persons will consent. Since Locke expects individuals
to consent only to that which serves their interests, the criterion of
natural law dannot bind men to social rules and authority which harm them.
vi
Thus consent and natural law are consistent and mutually supportive only
so long as the least advantaged rational person perceives his interests
to be served through obligation to rules and authority. Locke's theory
of justice is an embryonic version of Rawls' theory, and Locke's apparent
justification of unlimited accumulation should be rejected as inconsistent
with the whole of his theory of justice.
Adam Smith initially developed a theory of justice based on mutual
recognition and approval between persons. However, his fears that market-
oriented behaviour would corrupt morality led him to an economic theory of
value as a method for justifying the outcomes of market transactions.
The labor theory of value provided the objective measure of value, but
it also revealed the extraction of surplus. Thus Smith turned to a
"labor-embodied" theory, attempting to retain labor as the measure of
value while legitimizing property income. His dissatisfaction with his
own theory of justice led Smith to the threshold of utilitarianism.
John Stuart Mill found Bentham's utilitarianism to be an inadequate
theory of justice since it provided no objective criterion of right capa-
ble of generating consensus among opposing class interests. Mill intro-
duced a dynamic element, making the maximization of utility over time
the objective criterion of right. Through competition, superior preference
structures would develop so long as a class—neutral government maintained
the conditions essential to fair competition.
John Rawls' recent reformulation of the theory of justice reveals
vii
the extent to which liberalism must transform if it is to remain
internally consistent in the face of an interventionist government
and monopoly power. Responding to the failure of neoclassical wel-
fare economists to construct rational norms for liberal societies,
Rawls develops the maximin principle as a solution to the indeter-
minacy of the social welfare function. According to Rawls, this
principle would be chosen by persons ignorant of their personal
attributes and status and thus constitutes an objective criterion
of right which is both appealing and compelling to rational persons.
Yet Rawls has overlooked the prevalence of class divisions which
would make both the choice of and the subsequent commitment to
his principles of justice highly unlikely.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
The appearance of John Rawls* A Theory of Justice in 1971 sparked
a virtual renaissance of social philosophy. Yet Rawls' notoriety stems
not so much from the ultimate persuasiveness of his arguments as from
his willingness to make definitive statements about a topic which had
been largely .removed from the realm of respectable intellectual dis-
course. Specifically, Rawls believes that a single conception of jus-
tice exists which can be rationally defended. Such boldness demands
considerable substantiation>i'lanid /Rawls has risen to 'the task ifibh a 'book
which, given the initial response, will be the most controversial work
in political philosophy of the twentieth century.
Ironically, the analytical rigor which has led modern philosophers
away from the intense moral concerns of their predecessors is eagerly
employed by Rawls to give weight to his deductions. Even as he re-
kindles interest in the issues of justice, fairness, and goodness, he
urges that "we should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the
rigor which this name connotes."^ Rawls* work is suffused with the for-
mal precision of modern game theory, and much of the critical response
to A Theory of Justice has been directed at the illogic of Rawls* de-
ductions while largely ignoring the intrinsic merit or significance
of his principles of justice. However, Rawls himself cautions that his
work must not be judged solely on the basis of analytical rigor because
ii2
his reasoning "is highly intuitive throughout."
To fully appreciate Rawls* intentions and measure his success, his
work must be situated within a series of efforts devoted to the con-
1
2struction of a liberal theory of justice. The term 'liberal* is taken
to refer to the advocacy of social arrangements which are based on the
private ownership of property and the maximum feasible range of individ-
ual liberties. A theory of justice is a formal attempt to demonstrate
how rights and duties, which are a necessary component of all social
arrangements, ought to be distributed among individuals. What distin-
guishes a liberal theory of justice from ancient or medieval theories
is that the stress on maximum individual liberty elevates the individual
to a central role in assessing the justness of society. A liberal theory
of justice must demonstrate that the exercise of individual liberties in
the context of a private market economy will lead to a distribution of
rights and duties which is sufficiently satisfactory to the participants
to make them willing to continually affirm liberal institutions. Or,
failing in this, the theory must recommend remedial solutions which are
consistent with the institution of private property and the exercise of
individual liberties.
My intention in this work is to analyze the evolution of the liberal
theory of justice by focusing on the ideas of three prominent theorists
John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Then, having developed an
appreciation of the logical requirements facing a liberal theory of jus-
tice and the shortcomings of previous theories, I shall proceed to eval-
uate the Rawlsian theory of justice. The methodological difficulties
underlying this task are enormous. Empiricism is certainly not a suit-
able method' for evaluating theories of justice. On the other hand, logi-
3cal analysis, which may reveal internal inconsistencies in a theory,
cannot judge the theory’s ultimate relevance in a given historical
situation. Thus, I begin by rejecting what Mark Blaug refers to as
the "polar opposites" of relativism and absolutism.^ The former views
ideas as reflections of the contemporary social environment and usually
searches for logical necessity in the evolution of social structures,
while the latter focuses on internal coherence and logical necessity
in the evolution of ideas. I reject both of these extremes as being
partial or one-sided. The roles of ideas and the material world in
shaping the course of history are themselves historically relative,
and there can be no "general historico-philosophical theory."^
However, any analysis must be based on certain methodological
assumptions; careful consideration of the factors specific to a par-
ticular historical epoch will yield little without an interpretive
framework. For purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the relativist
assumption of an intelligible connection between social structures
and ideas. In analyzing theories of justice, it seems reasonable to
presume that the social structure of a particular society generates
a certain type of interpersonal relationship, which, in turn, gives
rise to a particular way of assessing and evaluating other people and
thus of judging how society’s rights and duties should be distributed.
Having accepted the validity of the relativist position for this
study, I also want to defend a partial reliance on the absolutist
approach, '^ince my study is restricted to liberal theories, I assume
Athat the basic contours of the problem of justice have been the same
for all theorists. Certain logical requirements face any liberal theory
of justice, and hence these theories may be analyzed and assessed as
detached intellectual discourse.
Employing both relativist and absolutist methods, 1 intend to
analyze the manner in which changing material circumstances have inter-
acted with a body of theory which is to some extent logically rigid.
At the outset, I emphasize that liberal theory is not a homogeneous
entity, but rather a collage of offerings from the various intellectual
disciplines. By their very nature, some of these disciplines have been
quite responsive to alteredconditions while others have been compelled
by the perceived logic of liberal society to resist challenges to ortho-
doxy. Thus, during periods of rapid social change, a certain degree of
dissonance has typically arisen between the prevailing "vision" of
society's economy, the "vision" of its political process, and the
contemporary ethical paradigm. The ideal point of accesj for examining
this tension is the works of the great theorists who have managed to
encompass the different disciplines. Possessing "that passion for
intellectual unity and simplicity which is a. .. legitimate ... feature of
scientific minds," Locke, Smith, Mill, and Rawls recognized that their
task required a comprehensive approach. The criterion of justice in a
liberal society rests largely with the perceptions of individual citizens,
and thus the theory of justice must encompass all aspects of experience
in which the sense of injustice might arise. While a theory of distri-
5butive justice for economic goods and political power is a central compon-
ent of a liberal theory of justice, political and economic theory must be
grounded in an ethical system which establishes the method for locating an
ultimate value or hierarchy of values. Once the criterion of right has been
determined, the relative worth of different persons can be assessed and
society s rights and duties may be distributed ’to each according to his
due ’
.
The liberal theory of justice has gone through several major transi-
tions during its approximately three hundred year lifespan. To briefly
preview the subsequent chapters, we may note that early theories were based
on natural rights established by individual sovereignty over one’s person
and possessions. However, as the uneven accumulation of property proceeded,
an increasing conflict developed between the inequality of property rights
and popular demands for equal political rights. To resolve this tension,
the natural rights doctrine was overturned in favor of utilitarianism.
Rights came to be defined in relation to their consequences for social
utility and hence were regarded as being contingent on circumstances. The
central problem underlying a utilitarian theory of justice is that utility
is a subjective experience and hence there can be no objective legitimacy
for a specific pattern of rights. Although various theorists have attempted
to construct objective measures of utility, their efforts have been thwarted
by the fact that individualsensations are a function of the social environ-
ment and hence cannot serve as an independent criterion for assessing the
justice of that environment.
6During the twentieth century, a comprehensive and consistent formu-
lation of the liberal theory of justice has been absent. In neoclassical
economic theory, the issue of justice has been circumvented by relegating
the determination of a fair distribution of assets to an unspecified social
welfare function. Liberal political theory has been characterized by an
unresolved tension between natural rights, utilitarian, and idealist con-
ceptions of justice. This vacuum in liberal theory was relatively unimport-
ant so long as liberal societies continued to generate empirical proof of
of their justice in the form of popular allegiance to liberal institutions.
However, the growing crisis of confidence in Western societies demanded a
viable and coherent theory of justice, and it is in this context that John
Rawls' work must be judged. Aside from any problems of internal inconsis-
tency, the criteria of success for the Rawlsian principles are whether or
not individuals in a liberal society could be expected to (1) choose the
Rawlsian principles as embodying their considered judgement on the issue of
justice and (2) continually affirm the institution of private property once
the Rawlsiam principles had been realized. If either of these conditions
is unrealistic, the Rawls has failed to construct a viable liberal theory
of justice. I shall argue that he has failed and that his theory is inade-
quate on two counts; it is based on a faulty notion of ethical behavior, and
it fails to comprehend the nature of private market economies.
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CHAPTER I
JOHN LOCKE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE
As popular ideology, John Locke's theory of justice has been
adapted with a straightforward simplicity which largely accounts for
its perennial appeal. From this perspective, property is legitimate if
through original claims to nature or through mutually agreeable
exchanges, and justice is achieved when economic resources are rewarded
in accordance with prices determined in competitive markets. Thus, the
^distribution of benefits is beyond challenge so long as productive as-
sets are acquired through fair procedures.
The foregoing interpretation of Lockean justice has been sufficiently
compelling that it still serves today as a major defense of private prop-
erty and individual rights, despite extensive alterations in both social
institutions and ideas during the intervening three centuries.^ In sharp
contrast to the popular view, a major theme of Locke scholarship and
interpretation has been the accusation of incoherence. Peter Laslett, in
his introduction to Locke's Two Treatises , claims that "Locke is perhaps
the least consistent of all the great philosophers, and pointing out the
contradictions either within any of his works or between them is no dif-
ficult task." Thus, Laslett adds, "it is pointless to look upon his
work as an integrated body of speculation and generalization, with a
t.3
general philosophy at its center and as its architectural framework."
Other authors support Laslett 's view. J.W. Gough notes that
8
9"Locke's theory is ultimately illogical if all its implications are
pressed." W. von Leydon, in his introduction to Locke's Essays on the
Law of Nature
,
refers to the tension between "Locke's hedonism and his
belief in an absolute system of moral principles."^ Von Leyden doubts
thatinconsistency can be avoided by any theorist who subscribes jointly
to "two doctrines which, if not altogether incompatible, are bound to pro-
duce vacillation and vagueness in the mind of him who holds them."^
In recent years, a trend has emerged in which the proclaimed incon-
sistencies in Locke's thought are either suppressed or synthesized into a
coherent framework. Laslett refers disparagingly to this trend as the
search for "some more remote and unrealistic principle of reconciliation
(which) must be found to defend a great thinker."^ Perhaps the first
formal attempt at such a reconciliation was made by Willmoore Kendall in
g
his 1941 work, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule . Kendall
argues that Locke was a covert "collectivist" who masked his support of
the general good with rhetoric concerning individual rights.
Continuing in this tradition, Leo Strauss overturned traditional in-
terpretations and claimed that Locke deviously concealed his true Hobbesian
inclinations. Locke "does not commit the absurdity of justifying (private
property) by appealing to a nonexistent absolute right of property.
Rather, he justifies private property "in the only way in which it
can be defended: he shows it is conducive to the common good, to public
9
happiness or the temporal prosperity of society." According to Strauss,
Locke shared the Hobbesian view of men as having no moral claims on each
10
other. Thus they would willingly submit to an authoritarian government
in return for the security of property essential to their "joyless
quest for joy."^^ Strauss’s theme was further elaborated by Richard
H. Cox in his Locke on War and Peace .
A not dissimilar approach to Locke was taken by C.B. Macpherson
who claims that Locke "logically destroyed his natural law system" in
his attempt to theoretically establish morally unfettered property
12
rights. Although Macpherson ’s work added a Marxist viewpoint to
Locke criticism, his basic point had been recognized at least eighty
years earlier by T.H. Green. In Principles of Political Obligation
,
Green argued that a state of nature governed by natural law could
lead to "no motive to the establishment of civil government." Thus,
natural law must not govern the state of nature or else the transition
to political society must represent a "decline" from the state of nat-
13
ure. A variety of other authors have similarly concluded that Locke
cannot be interpreted consistently without suppressing one or another
14
aspect of his thought.
Apparently, then, Locke may be interpreted in one of three ways.
The intricacy of his ideas may be ignored, the tensions between aspects
of his thought may be elevated to the extent that Locke's work no longer
deserves the title 'political philosophy’, or important aspects of his
work may be suppressed in order to preserve a coherent philosophy.
However, a fourth possibility presents itself in the writings of Locke
scholars such as Hans Aarsleff, Ramond Polin, and Patrick Riley.
11
Locke is viewed by these authors as having developed an elaborate and
rather delicate juxtaposition of theoretical elements usually regarded
as incompatible. Aarsleff asserts that "the overall tenor of (Locke's)
dominant principles and ideas is not inconsistent."^^ Polin makes a
stronger statement j we would like to show that (Locke's) metaphysics,
morals, and politics are tightly interwoven and that the meaning of his
political liberalism, a truly moral doctrine, can be understood only in
the light of his philosophy considered as a really coherent totality.
My purpose in this paper is to argue, in support of the fourth
position, that Locke did develop a coherent theory of justice. In the
first section, I shall illuminate Locke's intentions by outlining the
major difficulties facing social theorists as the institution of private
property gained ascendency during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Next, I shall cover Locke's resolution of those difficulties in the areas
of moral and political philosophy. Much of the material in this second
section has been adequately treated by Aarsleff, Polin, and Riley, but
in the third section, I want to suggest that their analysis lacks an
appreciation of the role played by Locke's economic thought in the
totality of his theory of justice. Finally, I shall conclude that Locke's
theory is relevant only to an economy based on exchange between indepen-
dent producers. The coherency of his theory cannot sustain the legit-
I
imation of
j
the uneven accumulation characteristic of capitalist devel-
opment. If true, my claim would indicate that latter-day Lockeans are
entirely misled in their attempts to employ John Locke s theory in the
12
justification of capitalist society.
I
Before turning to the evolution of theories of justice immediately
prior to Locke, I want to describe the general problem to which a theory
of justice is addressed. An integral component of any social system is
the shared body of concepts by which individuals find purpose and meaning
18in their daily existence. In an on-going society, these concepts tend
to develop quite spontaneously, become popular wisdom, and serve to chan-
nel individual intentions along lines consistent with the stable repro-
duction of that society. However, at certain historical junctures, this
process is disrupted as people either develop new intentions which con-
flict with the old social order or else find that a changing social order
impedes their original purposes. The popular response may be to seek to
either hasten or reverse the change so that subjective and objective
schemes are restored to harmony.
During these periods of discord, intellectuals are moved to employ
their theoretical skills to hasten the return of social stability. They
seek to describe a social order which is sufficiently grounded in 'objec-
tive truth' to command the consent of divergent interests and yet, at the
same time, roughly congruent with subjective intentions so that inordinate
sacrifices by individuals are not required. These intellectual constructs
have come to be called theories of justice.
Medieval theorists faced the relatively easy task of grounding their
13
conceptions of justice in a transcendent order manifesting God's divine
will. However, as private property and market activity gradually eroded
the stability of the feudal hierarchy, the "whole conception of a social
theory based ultimately on religion. . .was being discredited."^^ The in-
dividual conduct characteristic of the emerging social order frequently
violated the moral precepts of medieval society. Sensitive to the
intensity of men's newly acquired motives, early liberal philosophers
sought to buttress the transcendent mooring of medieval conceptions of
justice with appeals to individual consent. Thus they found unacceptable
any doctrine based solely on revelation. If moral precepts were to be
established which would take precedence over the expediency of the market,
they must have abstract appeal to and gain acknowledgement from all
persons, despite conflicting religious convictions or differing economic
status. From the beginning, then, liberal social theory was at least
partially grounded in the consciousness of the abstract, isolated indi-
vidual. This interiorization of the locus of legitimacy meant that the
appeal of ethical, political, and economic norms would ultimately depend
on what kinds of knowledge are possible. Epistemology attained prominence
in liberal philosophy as an attempt to excogitate convincing norms in
the absence of any criterion of validity. The foundation stone of the
moral edifice would no longer be found in 'the nature of things , but
rather in the norms of cognition.
As liberal epistemology developed, two identifiable traditions emerged.
According the the first, nature is orderly, and this order is intelligible
14
to the mind. Thus the innate and universal human capacity for reason is
capable of discovering objective moral rules and universal principles
which, when known, will serve to constrain the pursuit of arbitrary
desires in accordance with the law of nature. The appeal of rationalism
in the promise of a purpose to political and social conduct which
is beyond the mere fulfillment of contingent private ends. It provides
a deontological system of ethics in which the right is prior to the Good.
Rationalism remained suspect, however, because natural law, like
God's will, was beyond demonstration. Thus a second epistemological
tradition made sensory perception the sole source of consciousness and
motivation. This empiricist epistemology implies a teleological ethics
since the criterion of right must be immanent and subordinate to the
Good defined as the satisfaction of individual desires. Theorists were
not unaware of the shortcomings of empiricism. Whereas rationalism
suffers from the necessarily abstract and formal nature of its criterion
of right, empiricism must accept all desires as legitimate and thus cannot
provide a genuinely normative criterion at all. Similarly, while the
criterion offered by rationalism is so universal that it can provide
only vague and general social rules, empiricism's criterion of right is
necessarily arbitrary, capricious, and expedient. Recognizing these
flaws, early theorists usually attempted a synthesis of the two by basing
their theories on the consent of men, but, at the same time, searching
for an objective criterion of right by which to determine that to which
men would or wouldn't consent. Employing natural law theory to reason
15
about men abstracted from civil contingencies such as birth and fortune,
they sought to generate norms which would have abstract appeal to and
gain the acknowledgement of all persons.
To fully appreciate the difficulty of synthesizing rationalist and
empiricist elements in a coherent theory of justice, consider the work
of Hugo Grotius, one of the very earliest liberal theorists. Grotius
employed natural law to argue that the state of nature had been charac-
terized by the joint ownership of property and hence a natural equality
of rights. Then, shifting to consent as the basis for defending private
property and individual rights, he maintained that a social contract
would be universally agreed to as a means to prevent quarrels over the
use of nature. Grotius might easily have explained why men would con-
sent to an equal division of the once jointly-held property, but univer-
sal consent becomes problemmatic when men are asked to agree to a contract
which legitimizes inequality and undermines the natural equality of rights.
Facing this difficulty, Grotius injected a further element of rationalism.
Men, he claimed, have "a faculty of knowing and acting according to gener-
21
al principles” which leads them to perceive that private property is
in accord with the law of nature because it preserves men’s natural
equality of rights to enjoy the fruits of their labor. Men are thus
obliged by natural law to observe and respect established property rights.
However compelling this argument may appear, it is open to fundamental
challenges. One might ask how natural law can possibly oblige men to
observe a social convention which may reflect the influence of arbitrary
16
desires and expediency. Furthermore, if property is a social convention,
then couldn t a later, revised contract legitimately abrogate property
rights? Grotius's theory offers no satisfactory response to these ques-
tions .
Thomas Hobbes was another early liberal thinker who struggled to
find the mixture of rationalist and empiricist elements which would
produce a viable theory of justice. Suspicious of rationalism, Hobbes
sought to base his theory of obligation predominantly on empiricist
arguments. He did, however, make use of natural law theory to conclude
that reason, as a mere instrument of desire, was incapable of arbitrating
in the conflict between men in the state of nature who legitimately believe
that they have a right to everything. The chaos resulting from the un-
restricted pursuit of private ends and the resulting desire for security
would generate universal consent for political authority. Yet Hobbes,
like Grotius, still had not offered an adequate basis for on-going support
of and obligation to rules and authority which govern over vastly unequal
property holdings. Such a demonstration requires, in Macpherson’s words,
the "postulate that the individuals of whom the society is composed see
themselves. ..as equal in some respect more fundamental than all the re-
spects in which they are unequal." Hobbes appealed to both the equality
of persons before the law and the equal subordination of persons to the
impersonal mechanism of the market.
Given Hobbes’s emphasis on the primacy of economic interests in moti-
vating persons, the formal nature of equality before the law could not
be
17
expected to inspire consent to rules and authority which are perceived
by some people as thwarting their economic interests. Therefore, the
of Hobbes s theory of obligation is thrown onto the equal status
of all persons as buyers and sellers of commodities in the market. Yet
if individuals have fundamentally different economic prospects, their
status as buyers and sellers has only a formal sense of equality and
could generate obligation only if men judged that their economic interests
would be best served by a particular set of social rules. Thus Hobbes’s
theory is precariously tentative. If any individual perceives that his
interests would be better served by an alternative organization of
society, he could deny having ever agreed to the social contract and
his obligation would cease. This inadequacy should come as no surprise;
any criterion of right based exclusively on empiricism can only be
immanent, and so obligation to social rules can only be tentative. When
individual perceptions of self-interst change sufficiently, former rules
lose their legitimacy.
Unwilling to follow Grotius in appealing to rationalism, Hobbes
turned to a positive law criterion of right. This strategy reduces
„23
justice to legality; "the laws are the rules of just and unjust."
Although Hobbes has been accused of abandoning liberalism, he did offer
a liberal justification of absolute State power. Positive law derives
its legitimacy, Hobbes argued, from the fact that individuals have vol-
untarily consented to transfer some of their natural rights to the sov-
ereign in return for security of property. However, hidden in this
18
logic is a ploy which is unacceptable and destroys the viability of the
Hobbesian theory of justice. He has restricted the choice of individuals
to one of two options; they can either remain in the state of nature and
endure chaos and insecurity or they can consent to the establishment of
rules and authority and enter civil society. Hobbes does not, however,
permit the choice between alternative rules and forms of authority. Once
civil society is established, consent becomes inoperative and individuals
are obligated to whatever form society may take. Clearly, such a theory
locates no grounds for the continued affirmation essential to an on-going
society.
By the mid-seventeenth century, a viable theory of justice for the
emerging liberal society had yet to be developed. The task was indeed
formidable. Any criterion of right based on natural law lacked demon-
strability and could be appropriated by radical political groups to
argue that inequality in property holdings violated the natural equality
of rights. A criterion based on consent, on the other hand, was neces-
sarily contingent unless one accepted the Hobbesian state with its
absolute power. In response to this impasse, John Locke sought to
develop a theoretical framework in which natural law and consent, ration-
alism and empiricism, would support and require each other. In the next
two sections, I shall argue that Locke managed, through a rather ingenious
interweaving of apparently conflicting strands of thought, to form a coher-
ent, internally consistent theory of justice.
19
II
Nowhere in Locke's work do we find anything resembling an extended
thematic treatment of justice. Yet Polin claims that for Locke, "the
idea of justice. . .constituted the center of reference around which his
metaphysical conception of the world, his theory of man, and his moral
r\ t
and political doctrines are coherently organized." Polin 's statement
is controversial, but to argue that Locke's fundamental purpose was the
construction of a viable theory of justice is hardly to search for "some
25
more remote and unrealistic principle of reconciliation." Seventeenth
century century England was a society in turmoil, and it would be more
surprising if Locke had not been keenly aware of the pressing importance
of restoring a sense of justice. In what follows, I shall argue that
justice was Locke's major theme and that the apparent inconsistencies
within his work may be viewed as essential to his purpose.
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of classical liberal
philosophy were designed to appeal to an ascending class whose livelihood
was based on market exchanges. Thus men were viewed as autonomous agents
who confronted each other from positions of moral sovereignty. To the
extent that they recognized moral obligation, it must be consistent
with their rational self-interest. The task of the early liberal theorists
was to show that obligation to rules and authority that protected private
property was in the interest of all persons. Their strategy was to
simultaneously argue that each person benefits from a system of private
property (and thus obligation follows from self-interest) and that
private property is consistent with an objective moral order (so that
20
any perceived interest in violating property rights is both immoral
and shortsighted)
.
In developing the objective grounding for his theory of justice,
Locke relied on natural law. The natural law, which is "as intelligible
...as the positive laws of commonwealths,"^^ dictates that men have
property in their own person and that they may, by injecting their
personality into nature through labor, gain a proprietary claim over
parts of nature. By establishing property rights in the state of nature,
Locke resolved a problem which had troubled earlier natural law theorists.
If property was a natural right which could obligate others without their
prior consent, then property rights could not legitimately be abrogated
by any legislative body. With property viewed as an extension of the
self, Locke could place property rights on an equal footing with individ-
ual rights to life and liberty.
Natural law, however, was only one basis for Locke’s theory of justice.
He held that even a perfectly rational moral principle could not function
as a law unless it were willed by a superior being.
To establish morality .. .upon. .. such foundations as may carry
an obligation with them, we must first prove a law, which
always supposes a law-maker; one that has a superiority and
right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish ac-
cording to the tenor of the law established by him. This
sovereign law-maker who has set ^ul^^ and bounds to the
actions of men is God, their Maker.
Locke buttressed natural law with divine law because he regarded reason
28
as "only a faculty of our mind" which could assist in locating moral
principles but could not constitute those principles as law.
21
It is plain that human reason unassisted failed menin its great and proper business of morality. It never
from unquestionable principles, by clear deductions,
made out an entire body of the law of nature. (If rea-
son alone uncovered laws,) mankind might hearken to it,
or reject it as they pleased; or as it suited their
interest, passions, principles or humours. They were
under no obligation. ^
However, Christian revelation was quite a different matter.
Here morality has a sure standard that revelation
vouches and reason cannot gainsay nor question; but
both together witness to come from God the great
law-maker
.
Divine law was thus "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude,
and it gave natural law both its content and its authority.
Even natural law backed by divine law was held by Locke to be in-
adequate as a basis for a theory of justice.
Though the law of nature be plain and intelligible
to all rational creatures, yet men being biased by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
studying it, are not apt to allow of it as a law
binding to them in„the application of it to their
particular cases."'
Locke's rationalism had always left room for error in understanding. He
claimed that "without the help and assistance of the senses, reason can
achieve nothing more than a labourer can working in darkness behind shut
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tered windows." Since sense perception provided reason with the mater
ial from which to deduce the law of nature, any partiality in perception
might preclude full knowledge of one’s duties. This possibility was
reinforced by Locke’s theory of representative perception which asserts
that reason must work with ideas which may or may not adequately repre-
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sent the real world. We all "see but in part, and know but in part,
and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial
views
.
Given that knowledge of objective laws is unreliable, Locke turned
to an empiricist criterion of right. In the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding
,
he concluded that "good and evil... are nothing but
pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or
„35pain to us." Locke’s hedonism can be reconciled with his natural
law theory by arguing that pleasure and pain are the means by which
God guides man to moral conduct. However, Locke apparently shunned
such a facile solution, noting that
Men have a natural tendency to what delights and from
what pains them. But that the soul has such a tendency
to what is morally good and from evil has not fallen
under my observation and therefore I cannot grant it.
In the Essays on the Law of Nature
,
Locke offered a resounding
denunciation of a purely empiricist ethics; "if the ground of duty
were made to rest on gain and if expediency were acknowledged as the
standard of rightness, what else would this be than to open the door
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to every kind of villainy." He roundly criticized those who
seek the principles of moral action and a rule to
live by in men’s appetites and natural instincts
rather than in the binding force of a law, just as
if that was morally best which most people desired.
Can Locke possibly avoid inconsistency in both advancing and de-
nouncing an empiricist ethics? An affirmative answer holds only if
these apparently contradictory claims function as poles within a syn—
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thetic framework. Locke realized that a viable liberal theory of justice
must be grounded in the consent of men, yet he was certain that general
consent alone could not provide an adequate criterion of right.
...there is almost no vice, no infringement of natural
law, no moral wrong which anyone who consults the his-
tory of the world and observes the affairs of men will
not readily perceive to have been not only privately
committed somewhere on earth, but also approved by pub-
lic authority and custom. ^
Locke’s dilemma is evident. On one hand, he trusted neither consent nor
natural law to curb the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men.”^^
On the other hand, he believed that a divinely-based natural law was
'the only true touchstone of moral rectitude’ and that nothing can
obligate a person "to any Earthly Power, but only his own Consent.
His solution was to propose that the gulf between the ideal and the
/ 0
real be bridged by the authority of "a known and indifferent judge"^
with power to establish and execute civil law. Reluctantly, he con-
cluded that "for the bulk of mankind. . .hearing plain commands is the
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sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice."
The civil authority Locke had in mind could not be a king since
"even the princes of the world are... as well infected with the depraved
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nature of man as the rest of their brethren." Only through a system
of majority rule could the partiality of particular interests be sub-
jected to the public test of reason. Unlike Hobbes, Locke attributed
’natural political virtue’ to mankind. Men have a capacity for awareness
of the relation between private and public good and are able to construct
rules for mutual security without granting absolute power to the civil
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authority. Moreover, Locke believed that the rationality of man would
increase through ’exercise*, and thus active citizen participation in
public affairs would result in a civil code in conformance with the
law of nature. As a result, men would be led to consent to, and only
to, rules and authority which are objectively just.
Locke did have two major reservations concerning majority rule.
First, he would limit political participation to property holders since
theyhave demonstrated sufficiently rational conduct to permit them
to play a role in public decision-making. Second, Locke held that rea-
son alone was incapable of knowing the full extent of divine law, and
hence public policy should refrain from interfering with conduct which
is ’indifferent' from the viewpoint of social tranquility (e.g., relig-
ious beliefs and practices)
. So long as property rights are faithfully
observed,
. . .men of different professions may quietly unite under
the same government and unanimously carry the same civil
interest and hand in hand march to the same end of peace
and mut^^l society though they take different ways towards
heaven
.
The foregoing analysis has shown that Locke succeeded in construc-
ting a theory of justice in which natural law and consent are both con-
sistent with each other and mutually supportive. Without natural law
and its divine sanctions, men would lack sufficient motivation to re-
spect the rights of others and fulfill their duties. On the other hand,
without a ’known and indifferent judge’, which is the product of consent,
natural law ’is incapable of obligating men. The interpretations of
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Laslett, von Leyden, Gough. Kendall, Strauss, Cox, Green, and Macpherson
all mis^he fundamental point of Locke's writings; men are obliged to
consent to those rules and and authority which protect their natural
rights. Conversely, they are under no obligation to recognize the
legitimacy of rules and authority which are contrary to the law of nature.
Ill
The Lockean theory of justice is certainly relevant to a society
based on the private appropriation of property. Having rejected the
traditional doctrine of the communal ownership of nature prior to civil
society, Locke could argue that property, a natural right, was not depend-
ent on the consent of men. Thus civil law, which is a product of consent,
must have as its basis the absolute protection of property rights if it
is to conform with natural law. If the general consent which is essent-
ial to the legitimacy of civil law is to be forthcoming, men must perceive
not only that social rules preserve their natural rights, but also that
continued obedience to those rules will promote their individual interests.
Furthermore, since these interests are taken by liberal theory to be
economic interests, a satisfactory theory of justice must demonstrate not
only the justice of private appropriation, but the fairness of market
exchanges. Property is ultimately a claim on the benefits accruing to
a productive asset, and it is not immediately evident that market exchanges
will result in a just distribution of benefits. Due to this inadequacy in
the early liberal theory of justice, philosophers become increasingly
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interested in a theory of economic value.
Value theory supports a theory of justice if market prices can be
shown to converge on a value which is determined independently of the
market process. However, a theory of value alone does not constitute
a theory of economic justice. In addition, economists postulate certain
'constants’ which embody the "natural, psychological, and institutional
factors which affect the process to be analyzed without themselves being
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affected by the latter." These constants delineate the necessary con-
straints within which the economic process occurs, and they, in conjunc-
tion with the independent variable provided by the theory of value, form
an image of an economy governed solely by the interaction of ultimate
values and necessary constraints. Since that which is necessary is not
susceptible to value judgement, a theory of economic value buttressed by
constants in the theoretical system forms a theory of economic justice.
In this section, I shall outline the process by which value theory became
essential to the liberal theory of justice and then examine the relation
between Locke's theory of value and his natural rights theory of property.
Justice consists of 'equal treatment for equals', and thus the reali-
zation of justice requires some common dimension between persons by which
their similarities or differences may be assessed. From the perspective
of early liberal philosophy, men differ by what they desire, but they
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share a rational capacity for knowing the world in the same way. Since
the pursuit of means to fulfill arbitrary desires yields no common dimen-
sion between- -persons, the concept of justice was not applied to the dis-
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tribution of economic goods. Justice was held to be relevant only in
the arena of reasoned public discourse, and theorists thus subsumed
the theory of justice under the theory of political obligation. Since
the inherent justness of individual claims was indeterminate, the
justice of the political order would be assessed by its ability to
generate consent and obligation through the equal protection of all
interests. Hence justice was initially viewed by liberals as the equal
subordination of every member of society to the civil law.
However, the attempt to confine justice to the political sphere
was extremely tenuous because early liberal theorists viewed economic
interests as primary and regarded political activities as instrumental.
The Hobbes ian analogy between the equal subordination of citizens to the
law and the equal subordination of buyers and sellers to the market
might satisfy those concerned merely with protecting established claims,
but it did little to assuage the demands of the dispossessed for greater
substantive equality. Certainly, the political power of radical groups
such as the Levellers and the Diggers was insufficient to undermine the
viability of the early liberal conception of justice, but powerful mat-
erial changes were gradually setting the stage for a major reorientation
of social theory. In a society based on immovable wealth, the ownership
of property was visibly linked with power over people, and hence it was
inconceivable that economic theory should be separate from political
and moral philosophy. However, as production was increasingly geared
toward exchange rather than use and movable wealth gained primacy over
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immovable wealth, the economy emerged from its political and ethical
fetters. Coinciding with the increasingly visible autonomy of the
economy was the emergence of economic theory as a distinct body of
thought
.
The process by which economic theory came to play a central role
in the liberal theory of justice began as markets and exchange gradually
supplanted custom and tradition as the fundamental determinants of dis-
tribution. The theory of the just price, as developed by Aquinas, dis-
tinguished between distributive and commutative justice. Distributive
justice is concerned with the distribution of goods among members of
society or "the proportion between things and persons." Commutative
justice relates to transactions between individuals and requires the
equalization of "thing with thing." Aquinas claimed that distributive
48justice "prepares the field for commutative justice" (i.e., justice
in exchange is conditional on a just pattern of factor ownership.)
Due to the lexical ordering of distributive and commutative justice,
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market prices could easily diverge from the just price. In fact,
the market process, whereby an equality of thing with thing is estab-
lished, would satisfy commutative justice only when distributive justice
has secured the appropriate relations between person and person.
Aquinas was able to develop a theory of economic justice because,
unlike the early liberal theorists, he located a common dimension be-
tween persons extending into the economic sphere. Each person had
dignitas in proportion with his contribution to felicitas or the good
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of society. Distributive justice required a pattern of ownership in
accordance with the relative dignitas of each person. The early liberal
theorists, on the other hand, discarded the doctrine of the just price
as a potential obstruction to the free functioning of the market. Not
only could it hinder the competitive pricing mechanism, but it implied
that profit-making was an extractive phenomenon. As late as 1580, Mon-
taigne could write, "the profit of one man is the damage of another...
no man profiteth but by the loss of others."^^
Liberals were instead attracted to a subjective theory of value which,
like an empiricist ethics, measures the Good by what men desire. Grotius
considered need to be the most natural measure of value, although he
admitted that since man "desires many more things than are necessary,"
desire would also be a measure of value. Pufendorf observed that "the
foundation of the price or value of any action or thing is, fitness to
procure either mediately or immediately, the necessaries, or conveniences,
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or pleasures of human life." Hobbes held that "the value of all things
contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and
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therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give." The
problem with a subjective theory of value is that it leads to the same
impasse as an empiricist ethics. If value is dependent "upon the mutable
minds, opinions, appetites, and passions of particular men," then no
objective standard exists by which to assess the justice of market trans-
actions. So long as the theory of justice was conflated with the theory
of political obligation, the absence of an objective criterion of right
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in the economic sphere was ignored. Such a strategy, however, became
increasingly untenable. Seeking to free the economy from the fetters
of general morality, liberal theorists needed to demonstrate that the
logic of the economy was oriented toward the good of society. To this
end, an objective theory of economic value was developed.
John Locke’s economic theory was by no means built on a fully
articulated theory of value and distribution.'^^ However, while Locke
lacked the rigor of later economists, he clearly had a labor theory of
value in mind when he claimed ”tis labour indeed that puts the difference
of value on every thing. Similarly, he held that "ninety-nine hun-
dredths (of costs) are wholly to be put to the account of labour.
Although Locke never explained why he turned to a labor theory of value,
it seems reasonable to assume that he viewed it as a natural extension
of his labor theory of property. If a person obtains a juridical right
to dispose of a thing by embodying his labor in it, then he would, in
long-run equilibrium, freely exchange it only for those things which
embody at least an equal amount of labor. Since each buyer and seller
would behave in this manner, goods would always exchange according to
the ratio of labor time embodied in their production. Thus Locke
translated the natural right to appropriate property into a right to
the value-equivalent of the product of one's labor—a right which society
1 j 58
is obliged to recognize if justice is to be realized.
With apparent inconsistency, Locke also espoused a subjective theory
of value. Echoing the earlier liberal theorists, he claimed that "the
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intrinsic, natural worth of any thing (is) its fitness to supply the
necessities, or serve the conveninces of human life."^^ In another
work, he asks . . .what is the measure that ought to regulate the price
for which any one sells so as to keep it within the hounds of equity
and justice." The answer, according to Locke, is "the market price at
the place where he sells." Locke's attraction to a subjective theory
may have been motivated by his practical concerns with trade during the
mercantilist era. The labor theory of value couldn't explain the gains
from international trade, and it required the awkward distinction between
'contingent' and 'permanent' causes of price. However, Locke appears to
have turned away from the problem of justice. To equate the just price
with the market price is to lose any objective criterion of right for
the market process. Supply and demand are not independent variables,
and hence a supply and demand theory of value cannot provide the basis
for a theory of economic justice.
Once more, inconsistency seems to appear in Locke's work. Yet I
propose that Locke's supply and demand theory of value is no more in-
consistent with his labor theory of value than is his consent theory of
obligation with his natural law theory. Locke realized that market prices,
as empirical facts, must be legitimized by a liberal theory of justice.
At the same time, that very legitimation required an objective measure
of value to which prices must conform. Locke could hold both subjec-
tive and objective theories of value without inconsistency so long as
he could argue that market prices, where subjective elements play a
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role, tend, in the long run, toward values representing just prices.
In that case, subjective and objective value would coincide; in long-
run equilibrium, reward would be proportionate with effort and satis-
faction would be proportionate with difficulty of attainment. In short,
individual satisfaction would correspond with individual effort. Locke’s
dual theory of value was not merely expedient, it was an ethical proposi-
tion. The theory of supply and demand, like the theory of consent, sim-
ply provided recognition of the intentions of individuals. Just as the
market may experience day-to-day contingencies, the political process
may be temporarily swayed by particular interests. In both spheres,
however, rationality will prevail and the justice of social outcomes
will be assured.
IV
I have argued that Locke did develop a thoroughly consistent and
comprehensive theory of justice. Moreover, his theory dictates certain
institutional criteria of the just society. It must permit and preserve
the right to privately appropriate property. In the political sphere,
decisions must be subject to majority rule by property holders. Thus
one might be led to conclude that Locke’s theory can be taken as ade-
quate justification of a capitalist economic system in conjunction with
a limited political democracy. In this final section, I shall argue
that such a conclusion is mistaken. Locke’s theory is relevant only
to an economic system based on exchange between independent producers
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with roughly equal access to nature. His apparent justification of
the unlimited accumulation characteristic of capitalist development
cannot be consistently situated within the whole of his theory of justice.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, English society was based
predominantly on a simple exchange economy. Most labor was in family
workshops or on peasant holdings, and wages were usually supplemented
by some direct access to means of production. By the seventeenth cen-
tury, however, the uneven accumulation which accompanies capitalist de-
velopment was sufficiently advanced to generate a number of dispossessed
persons who were forced to bid against each other for access to nature
and the means of production. Once this condition appeared, Locke's
labor theory of property was no longer the theoretical equivalent of
a labor theory of value. A person could now command the value-equiva-
lent of not only the products in which he had embodied labor, but also
the products of other people's labor which he controls through the
ownership of property. Locke was apparently aware of this problem
since he initially attached egalitarian stipulations to his theory of
property. Property was to be a natural right only when appropriation
was limited by a dual requirement; individuals may appropriate only
what they can use without spoilage, and appropriation is legitimate
only so long as "there is enough, and as good left in common for
,.61
others.
Yet Locke apparently amended his theory in a way that made these
limitations inoperative. By consenting to the use of money, he argued.
3A
men tacitly "agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the
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earth." The use of money negates the 'spoilage' constraint since a
person "may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the produce
of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and silver, which
may be hoarded without injury to any one."^^ Locke also sought to cir-
cumvent the second constraint by assuming that appropriation and accumu-
lation would benefit all persons in society. The 'industrious' and 'rat-
ional' individuals would employ their 'quarrelsome' and 'contentious'
neighbors and thus improve the general standard of living. Justice, it
would seem, no longer requires a distribution of benefits in accordance
with individual labor, but instead is based on the tendency of different-
ial property rights to release the human energy which will maximize the
preservation of all.
Neither of the preceding arguments can be reconciled with Locke's
theory of justice. The use of money cannot be taken as evidence of con-
sent to vastly unequal property holdings because consent is obligatory
only for rules which conform to the law of nature. The Lockean law of
nature states that men gain property rights by 'mixing' their labor
with nature, not by purchasing the labor of others. The opportunity to
purchase labor undercuts the correspondence between effort and reward.
Locke himself was explicit on this point; money "transfers that profit,
that was the reward of one man's labour, into another man's pocket. That
ii64
which occasions this is the unequal distribution of money."
The assumption that unequal accumulation will benefit every person
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is thoroughly utilitarian and hardly fits with the delicate equilibrium
which Locke established between natural law and consent as bases for
the criterion of right. In earlier writings, he had vehemently rejected
an unlimited freedom to appropriate; "when any man snatches for himself
as much as he can, he takes away from another man's heap the amount he
adds to his own, and it is impossible for anyone to grow rich except at
the expense of someone else."^^ Locke was equally certain of his opposit-
ion to a utilitarian criterion of right.
For what reson is there for the fulfillment of promises,
what safeguard of society, what common life of man with
man, when equity and justice are one and the same as
utility? ...the rightness of an action does not depend
on its utility; og^the contrary, its utility is a result
of its rightness.
I am led to conclude that Locke did not intend to justify unlimited
accumulation. He simply 'reasoned' that society as a whole would benefit
when men continued to produce beyond what they could immediately consume,
and thus money could legitimately serve as a store of value. Similarly,
he found the stipulation requiring "enough and as good left in common for
others" to be impractical in a community where all land had been appropri-
ated. Locke's intention, though, was to relax the constraints on appropri-
ation, not to eliminate them. Inequality would be in conformance with
the dictates of justice only so long as the maj,ority of 'rational' per-
sons deemed it beneficial. Through consent, the objective criterion of
natural law would assert itself over the accumulation of capital. In
fact, Locke's definition of political power was the "right of making laws
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...for the regulating and preserving of property ... for the public good."^^
He gave to the political authority "a power to appoint ways of transfer—
ring properties from one man to another." Thus men could, through
their consent, empower the political authority to abridge the inviola-
bility of property rights whenever the public interest was jeopardized.
Locke's strategy was not necessarily utilitarian nor did it violate
natural law theory. Consent was the product of reasoned discourse in
the political arena, and, in the end, men would consent only to that
which was objectively right. Unlimited accumulation violates natural
law because it potentially forecloses access to means of production for
some individuals. According to Locke, a man is obliged to fulfill his
duties to others only "when his own preseirvation comes not in competi-
tion." When the claims of others threaten a person's well-being,
self-interest takes precedence over duties to others. Men's other-
regarding capacities would be suppressed as they sought to protect
themselves from disenfranchisement, and the moral order would disinte-
grate.
In fairness to Macpherson and other critics who find an advocacy of
unlimited accumulation in Locke's writings, it should be pointed out that
Locke placed little emphasis on the necessity of restraints on property.
He viewed private accumulation as a prerequisite for expanding social
welfare, but had he foreseen the emergence of vast concentrations of
wealth, he would surely have been more explicit in his reservations
concerning absolute property rights. For just as an on-go ing dialogue
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between rational men is essential to reaching right political decisions,
so lively competition among many buyers and sellers is essential to
achieving right prices. Economic monopoly is as much a threat to just-
ice as is political dictatorship.
John Locke’s theory of justice is a magnificent tribute to the
ingenuity of a great mind. Yet theoretical finesse could not disguise
the fact that the theory was becoming irrelevant even as it slowly
evolved during a lifetime of intellectual endeavor. Locke’s continuing
popularity in certain circles stems from the fact that he has been inter-
preted as providing objective justification for unrestrained accumulation.
Yet we have seen that his theory of justice collapses when pressed into
such a mold. Accumulation must conform to a criterion of right which
would be potentially appealing to every rational person, even the least
well-off. Thus in Locke we find the Rawlsian theory of justice in em-
bryonic form.
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CHAPTER II
BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND UTILITY: ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
Despite the intense reexamination of Adam Smith occasioned by the
recent bicentennial of The Wealth of Nations
,
a general consensus on
interpreting his works is still wanting. The bicentennial collection.
Essays on Adam Smith
,
reminded one reviewer of "the truth of the old
Indian tale about the blind men and the elephant."^ We should not, how-
ever, conclude that no progress has been made in moving toward consensus.
Perhaps the most significant area of agreement among contemporary critics
concerns the fact, if not the nature, of continuity between Smith’s two
major works
—
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and The Wealth of Nations
(WN) . This viexq>oint contrasts sharply with earlier interpretations which
stressed discontinuity, if not contradiction in Smith. Most prominent in
the earlier tradition were the German economists, Hasbach, Leser, and Oncken,
who posed "Das Adam Smith Problem". They found irreconcilable differences
between Smith the moral philosopher, who relied on sympathy as the basis
for social cohesion, and Smith the economist, who apparently claimed that
the unrestrained pursuit of private interests was sufficient to generate
social order.
Other writers who found themselves unable to reconcile the two Smiths
have tended to view his work as marking a watershed in the history of liberal
social theory; in the interval between the publication of TMS and WN, a
scientific co'nception of a self-regulating social and economic realm
assumed
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dominance over what had previously been an exclusively moral and political
domain. This position is taken, for example, by Elie Halevy who distin-
guished between the rationalism underlying Smith's economics and the natur-
alism which formed the basis of his views on politics and ethics.^ Simi-
larly, Jacob Viner claimed that "there are divergences between (TMS and WN)
which are impossible of reconciliation." Viner admired WN because "it
abandoned the absolutism, the rigidity, the romanticism which characterized
3the earlier book." Denying that Smith was an ardent champion of laissez-
faire, Viner proposed that the doctrine of a divine order of nature had been
jettisoned to reveal "defects in the order of nature without casting reflec-
4tions on the workmanship of its author." Sheldon Wolin also points to Smith
as a key figure in the transition from 'polity' to 'economy'.^ Finally, a
recent version of this line of argument is Albert 0. Hirschman's claim that
by reducing all desires to the desire for economic gain. Smith destroyed the
moral significance of the term 'interests'.^ Thus, with WN, the justification
of capitalism ceased to be moral and political and became purely economic.
In contrast, the increasingly accepted approach to Smith stresses con-
tinuity between his two major works. Empirical support for this position is
found in the fact that Smith left the content of TMS basically unaltered in
the fifth and sixth editions which appeared after the publication of WN.
Furthermore, Smith's Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms of 1763
reveals that his economic doctrines were substantially developed prior to
his contact with the Physiocrats who supposedly converted him to reliance
on self-interest rather than sympathy.^ Those authors who support the inter-
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relatedness of Smith's works fall roughly into two groups. On one hand,
WN is viewed as a special case of the framework developed in TMS. Advo-
cates of this position include A.L. Macfie who states that WN "gives
merely a particular development of the broader doctrine" of TMS.^ Simi-
larly, J. Ralph Lindgren views WN as an elaboration of a single aspect of
Smith's moral philosophy—that of prudence or utility.^ Finally, Andrew
S. Skinner speaks of "the degree of abstraction involved in Smith's formal
economics, where he was concerned with a part only of the range of experi-
ence which had been delineated in the TMS."^^
On the other hand, several authors have emphasized a greater degree of
consistency running through WN and TMS . Joseph Cropsey proposes that the
mechanistic psychology of TMS translates into an economic determinism in
WN . Moreover, Cropsey concludes, the commercial economy "generates freedom
and civilization", so that Smith was consistently a moralist in advocating
capitalism "for the sake of freedom, civil, and ecclesiastical."^^ Alter-
natively, Glenn R. Morrow claims that "the doctrine of sympathy is a neces-
sary presupposition of the doctrine of the natural order expounded in WN."
Thus, "it was an ethical, and not merely an economic, individualism which
12
Adam Smith held up as an ideal."
Given these widely diverging interpretations of Smith, is it possible
to perceive 'the whole elephant'? Is there a viewpoint from which the
alternative interpretations can be seen as a coherent whole? I believe so,
and the perspective I intend to develop is indebted to John Rawls insofar
as he has reminded modern thinkers of the central role played by the theory
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of justice in the whole of social theory. Employing this insight. I
intend to show that Adam Smith built two successive intellectual edifices
around the same basic intention—namely
,
the construction of a theory of
justice. The differences and continuity between the two edifices can
be more clearly understood by revealing their common base. A hint of
this approach is given by R.D. Collison Black who refers to Smith's work
as a system of thought which placed economic problems firmly in the con-
text of ethics and jurisprudence and which was informed throughout by
13
a concept of justice."
I shall begin by mapping out the contours of moral philosophy in the
mid-eighteenth century. It will be necessary to examine in some detail
the nature of the advance which Smith's philosophy represented over pre-
vious traditions. In the second section, I shall argue that the economic
theory of WN was shaped by Smith's intention to both revise and augment
the theory of justice developed earlier in TMS. Thus the moral philosophy
of TMS is incoherent without the economic theory of WN, and, conversely.
Smith's economic theory is puzzling unless its relationship with moral
philosophy is understood. I conclude that Smith's incorporation of econo-
mic theory into his theory of justice was based on his recognition of the
incompatibility between market activity and the model of moral development
set forth in TMS. Yet despite the revisions. Smith did not succeed in
constructing an internally consistent theory of justice, a fact which ac-
counts for his ambivalent attitudes toward most of the major institutional
features of capitalist society.
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I
Eighteenth century British social theory may be understood as a
set of alternative responses to the impasse presented by the Lockean
theory of justice. The coherency of Locke’s theory required roughly
equal access to the means of production for all persons, or, should this
condition be violated, a general consensus that unequal access served
the interests of every person. The events subsequent to Locke effec-
tively violated this condition. While the seventeenth century English
economy had been based primarily on petty production in agriculture,
the enclosure morvement and the destruction of the open field system
resulted in a massive transformation of society between 1688 and 1750 .^^
By the latter date, petty production had been largely replaced by capi-
talist social relations of production with large landlords, tenant far-
mers, and wage-laborers. Such a class structure was incompatible with
the Lockean theory of justice.
However, eighteenth century philosophers did cling to perhaps the
most important aspect of Locke's method. They sought to develop a cri-
terion of right which was neither purely subjective nor abstractly rat-
ional. The criterion should appeal to the Interests of concrete persons
in contingent circumstances, yet it should reflect more than the mere
fulfillment of any desire regardless of its quality. On the other hand,
it should be rational and yet not transcendental. In the words of Hegel;
Philosophy demands the unity and intermingling of the
two points of view; it unites the Sunday of life when
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man in humility renounces himself, and the working-day
when he stands up independently, is master of himself,
and considers his own interests. ^
Thus Adam Smith began with a full awareness of the inadequacy of
either empiricism or rationalism alone as a basis for a theory of jus-
tice. He rejected Hobbes's empiricist-based criterion of right by argu-
ing that a morality based on desire or self-love must reduce to one of
two moral systems. If we desire the good of society because of the in-
direct advantages to ourselves, then Hobbes's philosophy "runs into
that principle which gives beauty to utility. On the other hand, if
we approve of things which do not affect us, then we have a morality
based on sympathy. In Smith's words, "that whole account of human na-
ture... which deduces all sentiments and affections from self-love" has
"arisen from some confused misapprehension of sympathy.
The notion of a morality based on reason was also unacceptable to
Smith. Rejecting the natural law theory of Grotius and Pufendorf, he
denied the possibility of a rational ethics; "it cannot be reason which
originally distinguishes" between vice and virtue, because "reason cannot
render any particular object either agreeable or disagreeable to the mind
18
for its own sake."
Smith also rejected the theories of other eighteenth century philoso-
phers who had sought to transcend the empiricism/rationalism perspective.
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had established a moral philosophy based on
an autonomous moral sense which would restrain the potentially destruc-
tive pursuit of individual desires. Smith argued that any innate attri-
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bute of the individual would necessarily lack impartiality and there-
fore could not be relied upon to generate social order. Thus he rejected
"every account of the principle of approbation which makes it depend upon
a peculiar sentiment distinct from every other.
Finally, despite his great admiration of David Hume, Smith was un-
able to wholly accept Hume*s moral philosophy. Since Hume laid much of
the groundwork for Smith’s thinking, it will be useful at this point to
examine Hume’s theory of justice. Hume steered British social theory
away from its reliance on innate individual attributes. Viewing reason
as a mere "instrument" or "slave" of the passions, he made knowledge
20depend solely on sense experience. Positive social rules could not
be based exclusively on natural sentiments, claimed Hume, because the
passions always inclince men to give preference to those familiar and
21
close to them and thus cannot be the origin of impartial rules. In
fact, he rejected any natural foundation for social rules; "the rules
of equity and justice depend entirely on the particular condition in
which men are placed." Justice was therefore an "artificial virtue",
and the sense of justice could only develop through the experience of
the advantages and disadvantages which followed from certain rules of
conduct. The artificiality of justice was also due to the fact that
its goodness must refer to the advantages accruing to society as a whole.
Unlike the natural virtue of benevolence, whose goodness is evident in
every single act, justice may be contrary to our sense of humanity in a
particular instance. Thus, "It would as often be an instance of humanity
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to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable to them."^^
Such a situation could arise, for example, when "judges take from a
poor man to give to a rich" or "bestow on the dissolute the labor of
24the industrious."
For Hume, "public utility is the sole origin of justice, and... re-
flections on the beneficial consequences of this virture are the sole
25foundation of its merit." Hume was not, however, a classical utili-
26tarian, weighing one man's loss against another's gain. By utility,
he meant only the common good or the general interest of society in
maintaining social order through absolute security of property. He could
based justice on utility without involving himself in interpersonal com-
parisons because he maintained that "every individual person must find
himself a gainer" from the observance of social rules designed to pre-
27
serve property. This conclusion hinges on the strategy, first employed
by Hobbes, of comparing only two states—the existing distribution of
property and "that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely
28
worse than the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in society."
Employing this strategy, Hume was able to recommend "that everyone continue
29
to enjoy what he is at present possess'd of." Attempts to equalize
property would prove futile in raising the general standard of living;
Render possessions ever so equal, men's different
degrees of articare and industry will immediately
break that equality. Or if you check those virtues,
you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and
instead of preventing want and beggary in the
render it unavoidable for the whole community.
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As we have seen, Hobbes's attempt to construct an empiricist-
based theory of justice led to a positive law criterion of right and
the authoritarian state. If the conception of justice is ultimately
based on the assessments of particular individuals, then the rules of
justice would seem to be subjective and potentially arbitrary without
the moral force of the State behind them. Hume disagreed; "the rules
of justice are not arbitrary" because "the intercourse and senti-
ments in society and conversation makes us form some general unalter-
able standards by which we may approve or disapprove of characters
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and manners." This intersubjective perspective from which men could
derive a common conception of justice was based on Hume's notion of
sympathy which, though too partial and weak to serve alone as the basis
for justice, could be trusted to maintain commitment and obligation to
social rules. In Hume's words, "self-interest is the original motive
to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy with the public inter-
33
est is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue."
Hume conceived of sympathy not as a private virtue or an element of
human nature, but as actual participation in the sentiments of others.
Thus he viewed the development of moral consciousness as a social pro-
cess with an 'objective' moral criterion emerging from mutually shared
sentiments. By the mid-eighteenth century, then, liberal social theory
had already begun to transcend its initial vision of the isolated and
autonomous individual from whose attributes a criterion of right could
be deduced. Clearly, such a transition was required if the reliance
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on natural law and rationalism was to be reduced. However, Hume's
accomplishments also posed difficulties. Basing the theory of justice
on the subjective assessments of self-interested persons in contingent
circumstances is a potentially dangerous tactic for liberal theory. If
obligation is founded on utility or interest rather than consent or con-
tract, the obvious conclusion is that social rules can be justified only
so long as they generate widespread support. Each individual must be-
lieve that his interests are best served under existing arrangements;
otherwise, if the perceived advantage ceases, the obligation to existing
rules ceases. This flaw in Hume's theory could only be overcome by
advancing to a full-blown utilitarianism, where the social good takes
priority over individual interests.
Perhaps sensing the utilitarian implications of Hume's theory (along
with the corresponding degredation of natural rights)
,
Adam Smith was de-
termined to show that justice arises from natural sentiments rather than
utilitarian calculations. Smith's method can be fully appreciated only
with the understanding that, like Locke, he was seeking a synthesis of
empiricism and rationalism as bases for a criterion of right. He was
committed, in part, to Hume's view of reason as being insufficiently auto-
nomous to shape the social order, yet he perceived that if reason is a
slave to the passions, then man must lack the autonomy of a moral agent.
Without the presumption of some degree of moral autonomy, the theorist is
left with two strategies for grounding the social order—either a divine
will must direct the affairs of men or else the empirical fact of social co-
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hesion must be taken as evidence that the pursuit of passions by
amoral individuals is conducive to social order. Interestingly,
Smith has been variously interpreted as falling into both of these
camps. Some critics have emphasized his optimistic theism as the
basis for his arguments resolving private interests and the social
good. Others have lumped him together with Mandeville in concluding,
through observation, that 'private vices' work for the common advan-
tage. Neither of these positions is satisfactory for a liberal theory
of justice. The former is insufficiently secular and thus lacks popu-
lar appeal, while the latter is necessarily contingent. Smith rejected
both position as he sought to inject a rational, yet not transcendental,
element into Hume's theory of justice.
Smith's initial commitment to an empiricist-based criterion of
right is unmistakable; "the general maxims of morality are formed, like
34
all other general maxims, from experience and induction." He followed
Hume in relying on the operation of sympathy to generate intersubjective
judgements. Sympathy alone, however, could not provide a means of moral
1.35
discrimination since it was "fellow-feeling with any passion whatever."
Smith argues that prior to the expression of sympathy, we assess the
propriety of the other person's behavior relative to the given situation;
"Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion,
as from that of the situation which excites it." Thus a certain degree
of rationality is involved in the sentiment of sympathy. Although we
strongly desire to enter into the sensations of others, we feel sympathy
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only to the extent that the behavior of others corresponds with our own
sense of propriety.
Besides a desire to sympathize, we also desire sympathy. Knowing
that we can sympathize only with those sentiments of which we approve,
our desire for sympathy translates into a desire for approbation. Thus
we are led to constantly assess ourselves from the standpoint of others
in order to better determine how we may gain approbation. This continual
process of adopting the perspective of others gradually enables us to
transcend the particular viev^oint of both ourselves and distinct others
in order to achieve an objective view characteristic of an 'impartial*
and 'well-informed' spectator. Smith used the notion of the impartial
spectator to argue that "the sentiment of approbation always involves in
37
it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility."
We approve of the exercise of prudence, justice, generosity, and public
spirit because they appeal to the impartial spectator, not because we
have calculated their consequences.
Smith rejected a utilitarian basis for morality because he was con-
cerned to demonstrate that the criterion of right has a degree of inde-
pendence from individual interests. He granted that the utility of vir-
tuous actions might be sufficient to recommend them to men of reflection
and speculation," but utility "is by no means the quality which first
38
recommends such actions to the natural sentiments of the bulk of mankind."
Instead, because "the sentiments which (our acts) naturally excite in others
are the objects of a much more passionate desire or aversion than all their
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39other consequences,” rules derived from the experience of the approval
and disapproval of others are "the only principle by which the bulk of
mankind are capable of directing their actions. Yet even this strategy
for grounding social rules merely transfers the source of morality from
the individual's own interests to the equally arbitrary interests and
opinions of others. Smith, however, dealt with this problem by arguing
that "man naturally desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely, or
to be that which is the natural and proper object of vlove."^^ The desire
for praiseworthiness establishes an internal standard of conduct which ex-
tends beyond the subjectivity of self-interest or desire for approbation.
Smith ultimately appeals to "reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant
of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct"
as the source of intentions which are "capable of counteracting the strong-
42
est impulses of self-love." The moral person responds "to the applause
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of his own breast, as well as to that of others."
Although conscience is initially a product of the opinions of others.
Smith portrayed an internal spectator capable of becoming more objective
than actual spectators. Due to this autonomy of conscience, "real magna-
nimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the disapprobation of
44
all mankind." Clearly, despite his empiricist grounding of morality in
popular opinion. Smith sought to elevate the voice of conscience above
popular opinion and thus give morality an objectivity which it would oth-
eirwise lack. Undoubtedly, the voice of conscience represented, for Smith,
the voice of God, although his secularism restrained him from making this
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explicit. At one point, though. Smith offered the following consolation
for persecuted persons; "Religion. . .alone can tell them, that it is of
little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-
seeing judge of the world approves of it."^^
The moral philosophy presented in TMS is an intricate construction
whereby empiricist and rationalist elements are interwoven and become
mutually supportive. Smith quite obviously believed that a benevolent
God had designed nature for the purpose of .promoting the happiness of
mankind, and hence he saw no necessary contradiction between an empiri-
cist theory of morality and a rationalism which was little more than a
mask for religious faith. However, because he perceived the theoretical
weakness of basing morality exclusively on either method, he elaborated
a model of moral development which contained sufficient viability to be
subsequently resurrected by Mead, Durkheim, and twentieth century phen-
omenology. Central to this model is the notion of reciprocity or mut-
uality. Moral development becomes a function of the quality of inter-
personal relations since standards of conduct emerge only when approba-
tion emanates from others whose authenticity is respected.
II
Thus far, we have described a moral philosophy in which the human
capacity for reason is nurtured through reciprocal interaction based on
mutual respect. Yet this very condition troubled Smith, even in TMS.
He
perceived that in a market economy, "the natural course of things
may
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produce effects which shock, all (man's) natural sentiments
. For
example, "the general rules by which prosperity and adversity are
commonly distributed .. .are by no means suited to some of our natural
SGritiments. Whereas our natural sentiments would prefer to see re-
wards bestowed upon virtue, the market "pays little regard to the
different degrees of merit and demerit which (persons) may seem to
possess in the sentiments and passions of man." The market will re-
ward an "industrious knave" and overlook and "indolent good man."^^
Market activity also posed a threat to moral development insofar
as it promoted a depersonalized form of social interaction. A market
society functions as an association of interchangeable individuals,
identical in nature, and interacting anonymously and mechanically through
external ties. The inner world of values and motives becomes irrelevant
exceptas expressed in outward acts. Yet Smith had argued that genuine
sympathy and beneficience would occur only when individuals became con-
scious of their relation to the social totality and internalized the
morality of the impartial spectator. In the absence of shared intent-
ions and mutual interests, moral development would be stifled.
Despite his reservations. Smith was unwilling to launch a moral
condemnation of the market economy. To begin with, he argued that such
posturing would be futile since "the natural course of things cannot
be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man: the current
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is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it." Moreover, despite
its offensiveness, the system of rewards effected by the market is
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"useful and proper for rousing the industry and attention of mankind.
This essentially utilitarian defense of a system in which "violence and
prevail over sincerity and justice" ^ should surprise us since
Smith argued that utility "is by no means the quality which first recom-
mends .. .actions to the natural sentiments of the bulk of mankind.
Can Smith expect popular support for a system whose appeal is discernible
only through reflection on its future consequences? Certainly the ra-
tionality of the masses could not be relied upon to ascertain this truth,
so Smith posited a 'deception’ which, by reconciling sympathy with the
selfish desire to accumulate, would accomplish the task of which reason
was incapable.
The deception consists of believing that "the pleasures of wealth
and greatness ... (are) well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are
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so apt to bestow upon it." Smith consistently denies that the wealthy
derive much more pleasure from their enhanced ability to consume, but
because we believe that they do, we sympathize with what we imagine to
be their satisfaction and are led to desire and work for wealth ourselves.
Upon attaining this goal, we will find "that wealth and greatness are mere
trinkets of frivolous utility." However, the actual benefits of wealth
follow from the fact that we are more likely to gain the approval of our
fellow men than if we were poor; "mankind are disposed to sympathize more
entirely with our joy than with our sorrow." Thus Smith has ironically
managed to base ambition not on a self-seeking materialism, but on the
desire for sympathy. It is not greed but fellow-feeling which motivates
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economic pursuits.
Having injected an ethical element into market-oriented behavior.
Smith was still concerned about the effects of the ’deception' on the
®o^3.1 fiber of society j this disposition to admire, and almost to wor-
ship, the rich and powerful ... is .. .the great and most universal cause of
the corruption of our moral sentiments."^^ If we seek the respect and
admiration of mankind, we are presented with "two different models...
according to which we may fashion our own character and behavior." Un-
fortunately, the model of wisdom and virtue elicits the admiration of
"but a small party," while "the great mob of mankind are the admirers
and worshippers ... of wealth and greatness.
Only competition could guide the pursuit of economic gain into con-
formity with ethical behavior. For those who are subject to competition,
"the road to virtue and that to fortune. . .are. . .very nearly the same."
This happy congruence follows from the fact that "the success of such
people .. .almost always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their
neighbors and equals." The wealthy, on the other hand, are more inde-
pendent from competitive forces, and hence their "success and preferment
depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals,
but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and
^
• m57proud superiors.
Smith constructed a dilemma which may be best understood by review-
ing the following points: (a) market outcomes conflict with natural
sentiments, (b) this conflict may be resolved by a rational apprecia-
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tion of the consequences of market outcomes, but most people lack the
capacity to gain this appreciation, (c) an alternative resolution to
the conflict requires a deception, but this deception corrupts the
r^^bural sentiments. Thus Smith is left with the conclusion that market
activities, though they may encourage industrious and prudent conduct,
result in a society which is either unacceptable to moral persons
if if is acceptable, gains support only through a corruption of
morality. Admittedly, if all persons had the capacity to view society
"in a certain abstract and philosophical light," they would find that it
"appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious
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movements produce a thousand agreeable effects." They would discover
that the rich "are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same dis-
tribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the
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earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants."
Alas, the majority of people are preoccupied with what is near and fa-
miliar to them and cannot fathom such distant advantages. Most people
"despair of finding any force upon earth which can check the triumph
of injustice." For them, the only solace is the "hope that the great
Author of our nature. . .will, in a life to come, render to every one
60
according to the works which he has performed in this world."
Smith had developed a view of man as a social being who realizes
his human capacities and achieves the good life through developing his
reason. Why then, was he unwilling to place a greater burden on rat-
ionality to support the position that individuals could affirm market
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outcomes without falling prey to a deception which corrupted them?
Part of the answer, as we have already seen, lies with Smith's acknow-
ledgement that the pursuit of economic gain actually destroys the
conditions for moral development among large sections of the popula-
tion. More importantly, however. Smith was committed to a protrayal
of society as a natural process which human reason could only frustrate
but not alter. While he was concerned to support a certain degree of
autonomy for reason, he refused to allow reason to stand against the
"natural order of things". If reason were completely autonomous, then
men could, in the name of reason, seek to impose political restraints
on the market process. By grounding reason and morality in the natural
sentiments of man. Smith was able to portray political intervention as
an infringement on a natural moral order.
In IMS, Adam Smith developed a coherent theory of justice. Through
role switching, self-interest and sympathy are fused into individual
conscience. Society's moral code and rules of justice slowly evolve out
of the consensus of individual consciences. Smith did not seek to define
the content of justice and morality since rules are products of experi-
ence and hence will vary with experience. To give positive definition
to morality would be to assert the autonomy of reason against experience.
Thus Smith referred to justice as merely "a negative virtue, (which) only
hinders us from hurting our neighbor." To emphasize the absence of posi-
tive content in the term justice. Smith claimed that "we may often fulfill
all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.
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In restricting justice to the prevention of injury of one person by
another, Smith was following the Aristotelian notion of ’commutative jus-
tice'. However, commutative justice does not, by itself, constitute the
whole of justice. Individuals can be expected to desire not only fair
procedures, but also outcomes which conform to a conception of justice.
An implicit criterion of distributive justice can be found in IMS. Smith
believed that ’’that action must appear to deserve reward, which appears
to be the proper and approved object of gratitude." Moveover, due to
an ’irregularity' of the natural sentiments, a person's merit is judged
by his actions rather than by his intentions. The man "whose whole con-
versation and deportment express the justest, the noblest, and most gen-
erous sentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward" unless
he has produced an actual good or service which entitles him to compen-
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sation. On the other hand, "wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit
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and virtue. . .almost constantly obtain" our respect. It is "this dispo-
sition of mankind to go along with all the passions of the rich and pow-
erful" which provides the basis for "the distinction of ranks and the
order of society." However, as previously noted, this 'disposition'
corrupts morality, and hence Smith could locate no moral justification
for the distribution of wealth and the consequent pattern of rewards.
If we were to portray Smith's original notion of distributive jus-
tice in the economic terminology of WN,’. we would say that everyone in
society jointly labors to produce output, but that the quality of labor
differs according to the social rank of each individual. Distributive
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justice would entail a division of the social product in accordance with
the amount and the quality of effort by each individual. This viewpoint
is made more explicit in Smith's transitional works. He described the
natural price of a commodity as the equivalent of the wages necessary to
maintain labor in a given industry. Commodities would exchange at ratios
determined by embodied labor time, where labor would be weighted accord-
ing to the social rank of the producer.
In the transitional works. Smith also expressed doubts that commodi-
ties were jointly produced by everyone. He noted that "the division of
opulence is not according to work. The opulence of the merchant is great-
er than that of all his clerks, though he works less... Thus, he who as it
were bears the burden of society, has the fewest advantages
. Smith
implicitly acknowledged that labor produces a surplus and that, as a re-
sult, productive effort no longer corresponds with reward. However, so
long as he clung to his wage theory of natural prices, the existence of
surplus remained an anomoly in his theory of production and distribution.
At this point, I turn to WN in order to assess the relationship be-
tween Smith's moral philosophy and his economic theory. At the outset,
I propose that Smith was fully aware of the shortcomings of his moral
theory and that his growing interest in political economy was motivated,
at least in part, by his desire to provide a more adequate theory of just-
ice. Smith was initially committed to a theory of value in which com-
modities exchange at ratios determined by embodied labor time. He implied
that labor is the sole productive agent and hence should naturally receive
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the whole of its product.^® However, he was careful to distinguish be-
tween two stages of history. Prior to the accumulation of land and capi-
tal, the value of a good was determined by the quantity of labor necessary
to produce it, and the laborer received the whole of his product. In mod-
em society
,
the laborer must share the product with the capitalist and
the landlord, and hence profits and rent become component parts of the
natural price.
In interpreting Smith’s theory of value, two dominant and opposing
traditions have emerged. According to one view. Smith rejected the labor
theory of value as inapplicable to modem society. The realization that
' labor—embodied ’ could not be the determinant of value in modern society
forced Smith to substitute a ’labor-commanded’ theory whereby the value of
a good is measured (rather than caused) by the labor for which it can be
exchanged. In modern times, the ’regulator’ or cause of value is simply
the cost of production as determined by the sum of the natural levels of
wages, rent, and profit. Thus Smith finally arrived at an ’adding-up’
theory, where the natural rates of wages, rent, and profit, as determined
by supply and demand, are taken as independent components of value.
A second interpretation maintains that Smith did intend the labor
theory of value to apply to modern society and that he was thus led to
a ’deduction theory’ of rent and prof it. Both interpretations, I pro-
pose, fail to capture the full measure of Smith’s intentions. If we view
the economic theory of WN as being at least partially motivated by Smith s
desire to solidify the theory of justice presented in TMS, we perceive
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that Smith was not, in his own mind, being inconsistent in proposing al-
ternative theories of value. The labor theory was essential to locating
an objective criterion to which market prices must conform if justice is
to be realized. On the other hand. Smith sought to legitimize competitive
market prices which, he recognized, must cover the prevailing rate of
and rent as well as wages. In order to reconcile the empirical
fact of rent and profit with the criterion of labor as "the real measure
of the exchangeable value of all commodities," Smith developed the
'labor-commanded* theory. He was convinced that he had preserved the
objective criterion of his theory of justice while, at the same time, ac-
counting for the empirical fact that commodities do not exchange in accor-
dance with embodied labor time.
Smith's theory resolves the paradox of surplus, but by placing the
determination of value exclusively within the realm of exchange, it severs
any objective grounding for the component costs of production. The 'labor-
commanded' theory takes as given the very distribution of wealth whose legit-
imacy an adequate theory of justice must assess. Smith's principle error
was not, as many critics have claimed, to ignore utility, but rather it was
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to lose any objective measure of real cost.
If we compare the theory of justice developed in WN to that of TMS,
some interesting analogies appear. In TMS, moral standards are the pro-
duct of individual consciences developed through social interaction. However,
the operation of the impartial spectator imparts to those moral standards an
objectivity which makes them somewhat independent of the opinions of mankind.
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The degree of autonomy, however, is held in check by public opinion and
a sense of fair play. Thus Smith sought to ground his theory of justice
in both a subjective and an objective realm. He presented a criterion of
right which is simultaneously the product and the regulator of individual
desires and social behavior.
In WN
,
the checks and controls on individual self-interests appear to
be absent. Instead of a community of moral persons seeking mutual approval,
society is portrayed as an aggregation of individuals abstracted from par-
ticular identities or purposes. Smith was content to rely on this abstract
individualism,which he had rejected in TMS, because he perceived that the
impersonal market process could accomplish the same ends as the impartial
spectator. References to internal moral conflict are absent in WN precisely
because individual moral rectitude was no longer regarded as essential to
socially useful conduct. With the market process guiding individual conduct
into socially useful channels, reason became an attribute of the market
rather than the Individual. Whereas Locke had appealed to reason to oblige
men to restrain their desires. Smith believed that the full pursuit of de-
sire would, in the context of a competitive market, establish natural rights
and social order.
Even Smith's value theory bears a resemblance to his moral philosophy.
Just as the interplay of opinions would converge on moral standards, so in-
teraction of supply and demand in markets would determine the natural rates
of wages, rent, and profit. In TMS, Smith sought to synthesize the relati-
vism of opinion with the notion of absolute standards. In WN, the contingent
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value of a commodity (i.e., its market price) would converge on an objec
tive standard of measurement expressed in labor time. In neither case
were the objective standards fixed; for Smith, the absolute was Itself
relative to circumstances.
Ill
Smith s mature theory of justice involved not so much the displace-
ment of ethics by economics as a synthesis of the two. He sought to de-
monstrate that in both the moral and the material realms, the free inter-
action of individual interests would both establish standards of right and
generate outcomes which conformed to those standards. Moreover, the moral
and material realms would be mutually supportive. In IMS, Smith expressed
the view that society could subsist in the absence of mutual moral obliga-
74tions so long as persons refrained from harming each other. By the time
of WN, though, he had apparently swung around to the view that complete
justice requires the operation of the impartial spectator which, we recall,
requires a moral atmosphere for its development. Smith was quick to criti-
cize any group which subverted the interests of society as a whole by its
unbridled pursuit of self-interest.^^
Not only was justice dependent upon the functioning of the impartial
spectator, but ethical behavior would be fostered by the justice of com-
petitive markets. Smith noted that "when the greater part of people are
merchants, the^ always bring probity and punctuality into fashion, and
. .
..76
these, therefore, are the principal virtues of a commercial nation.
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It would appear, then, that Smith managed to resolve the conflict between
markets and morality which had troubled him in IMS. He attributed most
of society's misery and vice to social factors which he viewed as exogen-
ous to the operation of the market. Specifically, we can locate five as-
pects of society which Smith treated as institutional or biological datum,
^itst, hs undoubtedly believed that the bulk of inequality among persons
was attributable to "the averice and injustice of princes and sovereign
states." Second, population would grow at'a rate sufficient to exert
a downward pressure on the standard of living of the working class. Smith
observed that "the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, neces-
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sarily regulates the production of men." A third factor was "a certain
propensity in human nature... the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange
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one thcing for another." The trucking propensity was held by Smith to
be the cause of the division of labor and thus was indirectly accountable
for all the misery which accompanies that phenomenon. Smith blamed the
division of labor for the virtual ruination of human dignity. In a com-
mercial society, he observed, "all the nobler parts of the human character
may be, in great measure obliterated and extinguished in the great body of
the people." A fourth factor was the limited availability of land. Smith
predicted that a stationary state would set in when a country "acquired that
full complement of riches which the nature of its soil and climate, and its
.
.
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situation with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire. in
the stationary, state, both wages and profits would be very low, while rents
would be high. Finally, Smith took the distribution of property as an in-
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stitutional datum. He offered no philosophical justification of property,
but simply recognized that private property belonged to a few and took
this as an inevitable fact; ’’it would be to no purpose to trace further
what might have been (the) effects upon the recompense of wages of labour"
ft?if property had not accumulated so unevenly.
It would be tempting to conclude that Smith upheld the sanctity of
market outcomes by portraying the market as valiantly struggling to es-
tablish justice despite the inherent obstacles posed by nature and history.
On the contrary, he repeatedly revealed his opposition to market outcomes.
Perceiving that the power of wealth would consistently be put to the task
of subverting the competitive market, he railed against the inequity of
market distributions. Capitalists were "an order of men, whose interest
is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an
interest to deceive and even to oppress the public and who accordingly
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have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." Landlords
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"love to reap where they never sowed." Smith argued that both fairness
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and efficiency dictated a larger share of the social product for labor.
The argument can even be made that Smith was willing to employ the
power of the state to correct the injustices of the market. He assigned
to government "the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member
S(
of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it."
Moreover, he explicitly advocated intervention in certain cases; "those
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals which might endanger
the security of the whole society are, or ought to be, restrained by the
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laws of all governments."®^ If working class resentment over the 'deceit’
and 'oppression* of the owning classes swelled to the point of threaten-
^^8 social order, then Smith's maxim would dictate government re-
straints on the rights of property. In order to minimize the likelihood
of this action. Smith was quick to condemn the "sacrifice (of) the ordi-
nary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reason of
state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only...
QQ
in cases of the must urgent necessity."
Smith's continual equivocation concerning the merits of the market
has puzzled many readers. Yet, if we assume that underlying all of Smith's
work was the notion of a theory of justice, his various positions merge
into a whole. He was seeking to demonstrate that subjective intentions
result in objectively right outcomes. In order to establish an objective
criterion of right, he had recourse to a rationalist methodology inherited
from Locke; the labor theory of value showed that the market works for
justice. On the other hand. Smith sought a criterion of right which
would correspond with subjective intentions as manifested in empirical
facts. His empiricism revealed that non-laborers received part of the
social product and hence that the market was perpetrating injustice. With
this realization. Smith could have called for a major reconstruction of
the economic order, but, observing that society was stable and prospering,
he concluded that the benefits of the market more than offset any violations
of natural liberty, and thus it ought to be supported.
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Smith was on the threshold of a utilitarian theory of justice wherein
any 'natural' criterion by which the justice of society can be assessed is
abandoned. Like Hume, he seemed to recognize that the justification of
market outcomes ultimately required an appeal to consequences and hence a
utilitarian standard of right. Smith also perceived, however, a flaw in
utilitarianism which Hume, and subsequently Bentham, failed to comprehend.
Without an objective basis for the criterion of right, the liberal theory
of justice was contingent and ultimately groundless. Should the justice
of the market be contested, there could be no basis for reasoned arguments
in defense of the status quo. Thus, much to the bewilderment of later
economists. Smith hung onto the labor theory of value. His tenacity re-
flected not ignorance (even Locke had known that prices are determined by
supply and demand)', but rather a keen appreciation of the requirements of
a liberal theory of justice. The inadequacy of a natural law criterion
in the justification of market outcomes made an appeal to utilitarian con-
siderations inevitable. Smith, though, stopped short of a full-blown
utilitarianism, content to believe that the wisdom of a benevolent God
would not permit natural law and utility to be in ultimate conflict.
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CHAPTER III
JOHN STUART MILL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
John Stuart Mill's contribution to social theory is generally
thought to consist of insightful, but limited, advances in the areas of
methodology, ethics, and economic and political theory. Conversely,
the consensus among most interpreters of Mill holds that he utterly failed
to construct an internally consistent theoretical system applicable
to any one, let along all, of the aforementioned disciplines. A brief
survey of the literature confirms this point. The theme of "muddlehead-
edness and inconsistency" appears repeatedly. For some critics. Mill's
theoretical confusion reflects his identity crisis and the resulting
inability to choose between conflicting doctrines. This psychohistorical
approach is most prominently represented in the work of Mazlish, but
can also be found in books by Britton, Borchard, and Halliday.^ Other
critics simply find Mill's intellect inadequate to the task at hand.
According to Plamanatz, "he was often bewildered by the intricacies of
his own thought, unaware of the implication of what he had said and of
what still remained to be proved." In a similar observation, Sabine
concludes that Mill's theories "were always inadequate to the load that
2
he made them carry."
The specific charge against Mill is that he attempted to encompass
and synthesize diametrically opposed viewpoints. Anschutz contrasts the
naturalistic and deterministic approach of A System of Logic with the
77
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romantic notion of self-determination found in On Liberty
. Himmelfarb
finds an analogous conflict between the absolute principle of liberty
in On Liberty and the liberalism found in Utilitarianism which recognizes
such other values as justice, virt.de, community, tradition, prudence,
and moderation.” Ryan concludes that there is no "way of patching up
Mill's system which will make it both systematic and persuasive.”^
Mill's reputation has not fared much better in the hands of histori-
ans of economic thought. Jevons set the tone for subsequent opinion
when he labeled Mill's mind "essentially illogical” and described his
philosophy as "intricate sophistry.” Roll claims that Mill's "economic
theory lacks the logical rigour and his social philosophy the unflinching
consistency which are the outstanding characteristics of the 'system-
builders'.” Gray exemplifies the long-standing belief that Mill lacked
originality; "Apart from certain elaborations of the theory of foreign
trade, it is doubtful whether Mill added much, or anything, to the body
of economic doctrine.” Finally, in a less than enthusiastic assessment,
4
Schumpeter praises Mill for his "stimulating discrepancies of doctrine."
Those few theorists who have found a consistent theme in Mill have
often done so by simply suppressing important facets of his thought and
thus portraying his as a dogmatist of some particular hue. Cowling
accuses Mill of "more than a touch of something resembling moral totali-
tarianism." Furthermore, Cowling adds, "Mill's liberalism was a dog-
matic, religious one" and his "principle of individuality is designed
to detract from human freedom, not to maximize it." In a less polemical
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work, McCloskey also cautions that "Mill was seriously exposed to the
danger of becoming... a moral totalitarian."^
Recently, however, several authors have argued for a comprehensive
unity in Mill's work. Most notable is John M. Robson who finds "a unity
underlying Mill's mature thought, a unity both of purpose and method,
hidden often in a welter of detail, seldom explicitly formulated, but
always present." Similarly, John Rees persuasively rejects the notion of
deep-seated conflicts within or between Mill's major works. In fact,
Rees propses that Mill's conception of liberty cannot be fully understood
apart from his treatment of rights in Utilitarianism .^
I would like to propose that the diversity of opinion among Mill
scholars is indiciative of a widespread misperception of Mill's self-
conceived intention as a social theorist. The impetus for my claim is
John Rawls' recent attempt to reconstruct the liberal theory of justice.^
In addition to its contemporary relevance, Rawls' work makes us more
sensitive to the strengths and shortcomings of previous theorists. In
the case of Mill, much apparent inconsistency may be resolved if his
theoretical constructions in the areas of methodology, ethics, politics,
and economics are viewed as components of a more or less conscious attempt
to forge a coherent theory of justice in which conflicting class inter-
ests are both recognized and granted legitimacy. Thus I shall join with
Robson and Rees in arguing for an underlying unity in Mill's thought,
but I shall attempt to show that the theme of that unity is justice.
In the first section of this chapter, I examine the material and
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intellectual trends leading up to Mill. Toward the end of the eighteenth
century, changing material conditions rapidly eroded the legitimacy of
Adam Smith's theory of justice. The two major candidates for a post-
Smithian theory of justice, Benthamite Utilitarianism and Ricardian
political economy, were insufficiently comprehensive in light of the
increasing class divisions of the period. Bentham's theory lacked an
objective criterion of right capable of appealing to conflicting inter-
ests, while Ricardo's system left no room for subjective intentions and
aspirations
.
The second section contains an interpretation of Mill's ethical
theory as furnishing the objective criterion of right which was lacking
in traditional utilitarianism, while in the third section, I shall argue
that Mill's theory of justice was designed to appeal to the aspirations
of an emerging working class. From this perspective. Mill will appear
not as a muddleheaded romantic, but as an intellect who, more than any
other liberal social theorist of the nineteenth century, was acutely
aware of the requirements facing a coherent liberal theory of justice.
Mill's reputation has suffered precisely because he did not shrink from
the task of constructing a comprehensive rational criterion by which the
justice of society could be assessed; he pursued the implications of
that criterion even to the extent of questioning major institutional
aspects of capitalism. In the end, the inadequacy of Mill's theory
stems not so much from internal inconsistency as from his inability to
grasp key elements of capitalism. In the fourth section, we shall see
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that the Millian theory of justice assumes that individual preferences
will follow a path of rational development toward virtue and self-
actualization, but in practice, a capitalist economy poses obstacles to
individual moral development which Mill failed to comprehend.
I
Beginning around 1780, England entered a period of accelerated
social change. The mutually reinforcing phenomena of technological
advance and a resurgence of the Enclosure movement led to increases in
both the supply of and demand for free and mobile wage laborers. The
ascendency of mobile property and competitive market relations placed
a growing strain on prevailing notions of justice which incorporated
elements of natural law. The tension, felt most acutely by intellectuals
and theorists, had several facets. First, appeals to either reason or
natural sentiments were viewed as insufficiently objective. Prejudices
could masquerade as legitimate norms and no grounds would exist for
rational assessment. This fear became more pronounced with the perception
that opposing class perspectives would undermine moral dialogue. The
prominence of natural rights in the ideological justification of the
French and American revolutions served to discredit natural law and ap-
peals to reason as bases for liberal theory. We should not conclude,
however, that natural rights were jettisoned simply to avoid their revo-
lutionary implications. Progressive thinkers perceived that inviolable
property rights posed an obstacle to social harmony. In certain instances.
82
thfei.igood of society could be advanced through the limited abrogation of
property rights.
A second motive for rejecting natural rights came from the incoherence
of Adam Smith's theory of justice. His backward-looking notion of justice
entailed linking rewards with effort (i.e., labor expended). Yet, byi Smith's
own admission, the uneven accumulation of land and capital caused product
prices, and hence factor payments, to diverge from the labor standard.
Smith's weak attempt to avoid the conclusion of exploitation by resorting to
a 'labor-commanded' theory of value was apparently not persuasive even to
himsdlf
,
as indicated by his numerous remarks on the inequity of the market
system. By switching to a forward-looking theory of justice, where consequences
become the standard of justification, theorists hoped to eliminate all notions
of fixed entitlements or duties.
Another aspect of Smith's theory of justice gave rise to a third motive
for eliminating appeals to reason or natural sentiments in liberal theory.
Smith had carefully described the interpersonal process by which rampant
egoism would be held in check by an 'impartial spectator' within each person.
Central to Smith's theory of moral development was the phenomenon of mutual
recognition and approbation between persons based on shared values. Smith
voiced his fears that the market process would impede the formation of in-
dividual conscience, and subsequent theorists saw little evidence that
egoistic behavior would be curbed in an impersonal, exchange-oriented system
of social relations. Optimism concerning social stability would
have to
be based on an assumed harmony of interests so that individuals
could simul-
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taneously be egoistic and fulfill their moral obligations.
The attack on natural rights served a dual purpose; a purpose that was
conservative and, at the same time, progressive. The elimination of any
natural criterion of right which might be employed to challenge the justice
of the status quo freed the accumulation process to follow the course of
the maximum self-expansion of capital with no
^ priori constraints on the
resulting contours of society. In addition, however, disposing of natural
rights opened the door to working class interests, so long as appeals were
couched in terms of consequences rather than deserts. This dual nature of
early nineteenth century liberalism reflected the paradox of defending, on
one hand, the legitimacy of property against the challenge' ^ef the developing
working class movement and seeking, on the other hand, to extend liberalism’s
base of support in order to solidify its strength against the landed aris-
tocracy. The primary appeal which liberal theorists offered to the working
class was a strong opposition to fixed status, hierarchy, and arbitrary i
authority. Property would be a social convention, and hence the rules of
justice would be open to revision in the light of new knowledge and revised
circumstances
.
The opposition to natural rights, under the leadership of Jeremy Bentham
took the form of Utilitarianism. Bentham sought a doctrine which would have
widespread appeal and, at the same time, not stir up the revolutionary fervor
which had engulfed France. Although Bentham never used the term, Utilitarian
ism can be viewed as ’a theory of justice'. It offers a criterion of right
which is purported to be both appealing and compelling, Bentham claimed
to
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have constructed a rational basis for determining rights and duties simply
by taking human nature and society as they exist. Individuals were assumed
to be pleasure maximizers and thus infinitely desirous of consumable objects.
Society was taken to be nothing more than the aggregation of these individuals.
If individuals are infinite consumers, then clearly all desires or intentions
cannot possibly be met. In order to avoid social unrest, this disappointment
must be seen to flow from an impartial and equitable process. In other words,
each individual's inability to fully realize his essence must be attributed
either to personal inadequacy or to 'necessary' conditions imposed by nature.
If this is accomplished, disppointment should not translate into resentment
or envy toward those who have fared better, and social stability can be
maintained.
In order to generate consensus on questions concerning rights and justice,
Bentham wanted to prove the existence of a single criterion of right which
no rational man could reject. Although he recognized the legitimacy of
both deductive and inductive proofs in other areas, Bentham admitted that
the single criterion of right, by its very nature, was insusceptible to
formal proof. Thus his approach consisted of refuting all candidates for
the criterion other than the principle of utility. He rejected appeals to
right reason, common sense, natural law, or moral sentiment on the grounds
that they provided no "extrinsic ground" for moral judgements. From Ben-
tham 's view.
What one expects to find in a principle is something that
points out some external consideration as a means of war-
ranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation
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and disapprobation; this expectation is but ill fulfilled
by a proposition which does neither more nor less than hold
up each„of those sentiments as a ground and standard for
itself.
S^ritham s goal of eradicating the infludnce of feeling on morality
and subjecting moral judgements to rational assessment was quite differ-
ent from Locke’s conception of uncovering a rational natural law. Reason,
for Bentham, was not an 'inner light' to be consulted in the quest for
right, but rather a calculating assessment of objectively measurable con-
sequences flowing from acts or rules. Any theory not grounded in conse-
quences, whether it appealed to reason or to sentiments, was, according
to Bentham, 'subjective' and hence incapable of offering a principle
which could command the assent of different persons. Thus in the hands
of the Utilitarians, the classical liberal methods of rationalism and
empiricism underwent a peculiar transformation. By disclaiming any
reliance on subjective knowledge, the Utilitarians firmly aligned them-
selves with the empiricist side of liberal theory as developed by Hume
out of Locke's dual epistemology. Yet the Utilitarians were actually
rationalists insofar as they believed that reason could disclose objective
grounds for moral decisions. They believed that their rationalism avoided
the subjectivity of Lockean rationalism because they focused on interper-
sonally verifiable consequences rather than _a priori assumptions. Yet
Utilitarianism does involve assumptions of a nonempirical nature. First,
all individuals are assumed to have roughly equal capacities for happiness.
Second, it is assumed that no qualitative differences exist between pleas-
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ures so that pleasures and pains are susceptible to being the objects of
a rational calculus. Third, pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain
are assumed to be the sole motivating forces behind human behavior and
the maximization of utility is made the criterion of right; thus the
moral person is obligated to act so as to maximize social utility.
The Utilitarians were also mistaken in thinking that the measurement
of pleasures and pains resulting from acts and rules can be an entirely
objective process. The ultimate ramifications of any particular act are
potentially infinite, and thus assessing consequences must necessarily
involve a subjective judgement as to which consequences are reasonable to
include. More significantly, pleasures and pains are themselves subjective
phenomena, and although Bentham went to great lengths to describe the vari-
ous dimensions of pleasure and pain and thus to make plausible the notion
of measurement, he acknowledged that sensations were not interpersonally
commensurable
.
Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition
will continue distinct as they were before, one man's happiness
will never be another man's happiness: a gain to one man is not
gain to another: you might as well pretend to add twenty apples
to twenty pears, which after you had done that could not be forty
of any one thing but twenty of each just as there were before.
After affirming the incommensurability of pleasures, Bentham then argues
that we must proceed as though the opposite were true.
This addibility of the happiness of different subjects, however,
when considered rigorously, it may appear fictitious, is a pos-
tulatum without the allowance of which all pblitical reasoning
is at a standstill.
Thus Bentham 's defense of the principle of utility is
ultimately an appeal
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to faith. The principle could only remain practicable as a basis for
social organization if it was assumed that major institutions and pre-
vailing patterns of behavior were naturally .-oriented toward the maxi-
mization of utility. Bentham made this assumption; he posited a nat-
ural harmony of interests, at least in the economic sphere, and thus a
laissez faire policy would maximize social utility.
Another consequence of the harmony of interests assumption was that
individuals motivated purely by jileasure could pursue their interests
without violating their moral obligations to serve the general interest.
Bentham did recognize short-run conflicts of interest that might arise
due to insufficient education. Thus, in the political sphere, the legis-
lator should create an artificial harmony of interests by providing in-
centives and punishments to insure that individuals would associate
their own pleasure with the general well-being of society. Even in the
economic sphere, utility maximization may require some redistributive
intervention on the part of the State. If all persons have equal capa-
cities for pleasure, then, assuming a diminishing marginal utility for
money, it would seem to follow that utility would be maximized with a
perfectly equal distribution of wealth. Bentham initially agreed; The
more nearly the actual proportion (of wealth) approaches to equality,
the greater will be the total mass of happiness." However, other con-
siderations must enter into a redistributive scheme. Since "property is
only a foundation of expectations. . .of deriving certain advantages
from
the thing said to be possessed, any threat to the oertalntyoof
this
11
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expectation may be destabilizing and destroy the original harmony of
interests. Thus Bentham rejected the supposition that greater equality
increase social utility; "When security and equality
are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give
..15
way.
Just as Bentham believed that the long-run interests of society would
be best served by a laissez faire economic policy, he held that the need
for legislative intervention in the political sphere would decrease as
time passed. His optimism was based on his belief in a human proclivity
for benevolence, sympathy, and a disinterested viewpoint;
the general and standing bias of every man’s nature is,
therefore, towards that side to which the force of the
social motives would determine him to adhere. This being
the case, the force of the social motives tends co^^in-
ually to put an end to that of the dissocial ones.
James Mill’s associationist psychology persuaded Bentham to formulate the
'law of progressive sympathy’. As society developed, the process of in-
dustrialization and socialization would cause people to become "everyday
more virtuous than on the former day." They "will continue to do so till,
if ever, they naturally shall have arrived at its perfection.
Utilitarianism was viewed by its proponents as providing a theory of
justice superior to those of Locke and Smith which had been based at least
partially on natural rights. By rejecting a natural criterion of right,
Bentham believed that he had freed social theory and social policy from
any metaphysical entanglements which might pose obstacles to the most ra-
pid possible expansion of social utility. Yet it was precisely the absence
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of a natural criterion which rendered Benthara's theory i inadequate as a
theory of justice. Both Locke and Smith had perceived that a theory
of justice based solely on empiricism will fail to provide an objective
criterion of right capable of appealing to conflicting interests. Ben-
tham’s claim to have developed an objective criterion (i.e., maximum
social utility) remains plausible only so long as a natural harmony of
interests prevails. If any conflict of interest is admitted, then inter-
personal comparisons of utility must be made in order to ascertain the
position of maximum social utility. At that point, Bentham’s theory
loses its objectivity as class interests vie with one another to deter-
mine whose pleasures and pains will count most. Political obligation
becomes totally contingent as each individual assesstJthe advantages of
obedience versus resistance. Benthara fully recognized this implication;
he noted that for each person, the decisive factor in deciding whether
or not to revolt must be "his own internal persuasion of a balance of
18
utility on the side of resistance."
Ironically, then. Utilitarianism, which had begun as a theoretical
device for eliminating dogma and inflexibility from liberal theory, ended
with destroying any objective justification for the capitalist system.
By focusing on the forward-looking notion of consequences rather than the
backward-looking notion of merit. Utilitarianism undermined the ordinary
conception of justice as reward in accordance with merit. The very defi
nition of rights was made the object of contestation. Those groups having
the political power to weight consequences in their own interests would
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thereby have the power to determine rights and justice. Thus Bentham’s
utilitarianism could serve as a functional ideology only so long as
a widespread belief in a natural harmony of interests prevailed. By 18A0,
the ernergingfclass consciousness of the working class effectively destroyed
this condition.
I turn now to the other major intellectual trend connecting Adam Smith
and John Stuart Mill—David Ricardo’s political economy. Unlike Smith, who
concentrated on the growth of national income, Ricardo was more concerned
with its distribution among the three classess— landlords, capitalists,
and laborers. Wliile Ricardo's theory is not usually thought of as a theory
of justice, it served the purpose of demonstrating that those aspects of
the distribution process which were dependent on human intentions did
conform to an objective criterion of right. However, the fundamental de-
terminants of the division of the social product were, according to Ricardo,
phenomena over which society had no- control and hence they could not be
called either just or unjust.
Ricardo contracted his economic theory around three natural phenomena
—
the fertility of the soil, the rate of population growth, and the develop-
ment of technology in agriculture. According to Malthus' population theory,
long-run wages would be determined by the subsistence standard of living.
Profits per worker, in turn, would be determined by the difference between
the marginal product of labor applied to the marginal, or least fertile,
land under cultivation and the subsistence wage. Then, given the fertility
of the soil and agricultural productivity, rent was simply the surplus over
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and above wages and profit on all inframarginal land. From the Ricardian
viewpoint, the economy advanced when improvements in agricultural pro-
ductivity led to increases in profits (determined by the surplus over
wages for production on the no-rent, marginal land). In turn, rising
profits would increase the rate of capital accumulation which would result
in a larger 'wages-fund* to advance to workers as wages. However, rising
wages would cause the population to increase which would necessitate the
cultivation of inferior land, leading to falling profits, a slower rate
of increase in the 'wages-fund
' ,
and finally a slowing of population
growth. Thus the long run distribution of the social product was por-
trayed as an objectively determinateoprocess
. The technical conditions of
production in agriculture determined the prevailing rate of profit, the
subsistence standard of living determined the wage rate, and rent com-
prised the remainder of the value of output. Only one element is missing.
Unless it is assumed that the economy produces only a single product, some
measure of value is needed in order to compare the total value of the
different distributive shares through time. Since Ricardo sought to
ground his theory of distribution exclusively in the conditions of pro-
duction, he rejected Smith's 'labor-commanded' theory of value. He argued
that labor—commanded "is subject to an many fluctuations as the commodities
compared with it," and therefore it cannot serve as "an invariable standard,
20
indicating correctly the variations of dJther things. Ricardo believed
that only a 'labor-embodied' theory of value could provide an invariable
standard. He was not troubled by the fact that commodities did not actu-
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ally exchange at ratios determined by embodied labor time because he
understood that different capital/labor ratios and durations of the
P^^^^^bion process in different industries would cause actual exchange
ratios to deviate from the ratios of embodied labor time. For Ricardo,
this phenomenon made the labor theory of value inexact, but he still
2
1
considered it the best theory of relative prices.
A determinate theory of the economic process cannot, by itself,
remove the distribution of. output from the realm of moral assessment.
Conceivably, state intervention could alter the initial conditions of
the economy so as to give a preferred outcome. Thus, if Ricardo's
theory is to serve as a theory of justice supporting market outcomes,
it must show not only that those outcomes are determinate, but also
that the initial conditions underlying those outcomes are acceptable
to rational persons. This second requirement can be met by demonstrat-
ing a natural harmony of interests in capitalism. For this purpose,
the labor theory of value can be employed to show the justice of the
static laws of exchange in competitive markets. However, Ricardo's
dynamic theories of population, rent, wages, and profits reveal funda-
mental conflicts of interest between the classes. Since rent is the
residual after wages and profits have been deducted from the social
product, the interests of the landlords are opposed to those of both
capitalists and workers. , Furthermore, Ricardo's claim that wages and
profits vary inversely with each other would seem to indicate a clash
between the interests of workers and capitalists. Yet, aside from vol-
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untary limitations on population growth, Ricardo believed that high
profits and rapid accumulation held the only hope for improvement in
the workers* standard of living. Thus he does argue for a certain
degree of harmony between capitalists and workers, but he was more
concerned to show that any attempts by workers to forcefully push up
their wages would necessarily result in lower profits. Conversely,
any successful attempts by employers to push down wages would result
in higher profits. Significantly, both these cases (i.e., workers com-
bining to raise wages and employers combining to lower wages) are based
on violations of the rules of the competitive market. Thus Ricardo
might be defended as having demonstrated a harmony of interests between
capitalists and workers within the rules of competitive markets. Yet
even this qualified statement cannot be supported. In the third edition
of his Principles
,
Ricardo argued that if more capital were invested in
machinery, then less capital would be available to pay wages. Thus the
ordinary process of accumulation and investment creates unemployment as
machines displace workers. We must conclude, therefore, that Ricardo
did not support the notion of a harmony of interests between any of the
classes in capitalist society.
Without the harmony of interests doctrine, Ricardo's theory collapses
as a theory of justice. True, he had located an objective criterion of
right (i.e., abstract labor time), and he delineated the determining role
of the 'natural* constants; distribution was portrayed as the outcome of
individual effort operating under 'natural' >'.oonstraints. However, Ricardo
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took as a constant something that was increasingly the subject of con-
flict the distribution of property. His dismal prognotications assumed
man’s powerlessness to alter the conditions of his existence. One of
these conditions was supposed to be the prevailing distribution of pro-
perty, yet the Utilitarians were engaged in destroying the ’natural’
aspect of property rights. Simultaneously, the working class began to
exert its newly realized political clout. With the legitimacy of pro-
perty rights under attack, the labor theory of value could be employed
to reveal exploitation rather than harmony arising from the exchange of
value-equivalents in a capitalist market. Under these conditions, the
need for a reformulation of the liberal theory of justice was urgent.
Both the Utilitarian’s forward-looking appeal to consequences in terms
of pleasure and painland Ricardo’s backward-looking appeal to abstract
labor time had failed to provide an objective criterion of right for
a society built around fundamental conflicts of interest. The search
for a viable liberal theory of justice would occupy the bulk of John
Stuart Mill’s intellectual energies for the next several decades.
II
The complexity of Mill’s philosophy demands a step-by-step recon-
struction of his theory of justice. In this section, I shall examine
the methodological underpinnings of Mill’s ethics before proceeding to
a full elaboration of his theory of justice in the following section.
At the outset, I acknowledge the inherent difficulty of developing a
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consistent interpretation of a philosopher who has alternately been
labeled a rationalist and an empiricist, a nominalist and a realist, a
materialist and an idealist, and an advocate of free will and determin-
ism. Clearly, I must demonstrate a great deal of ingenuity on Mill's
part in order to argue that he successfully spanned these diametrically
opposed philosophical traditions. I begin by outlining the alleged con-
flicts within Mill's logic and scientific method.
Mill aligned himself firmly with the school of experience as opposed
to intuition, and thus he was attracted to inductive logic. Normally,
induction can only lead to empirical generalizations, but Mill sought
a demonstrative theory of inductive proof. The very notion of induc-
tive proof presupposes a thoroughly rationalist conception of nature,
and Mill's cosmology presents just such a view.
Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with
the causes which produced them; including not only
all that happens but all that is capable of happening;
the unused capabilities of causes being as much a^gart
of the idea of Nature as those which take effect.
Thus, for Mill, experienced phenomena must always be analyzed by con-
necting them with underlying natural laws. In terms of logic, particulars
are simply expressions of underlying universals.
Mill postulates a law of universal causation behind all phenomena.
This law is discovered empirically and proven inductively, but, once
proven, it permits inference from "particulars to particulars". Mill's
notion of inductive proof seems to lead him to the conclusion that cer-
tainty is attainable through scientific experimentation. His theory of
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the syllogism, on the other hand, states that universals are merely col-
lections of particulars, and thus all inferences must be uncertain. Ac-
tually, this switching from a realist to a nominalist theory of universals
is more apparent than real. Mill's universal laws of nature are more
accurately described as inferences from his cosmology rather than as
inductions from experience. He maintained that
the nature and laws of things in themselves, or of the
hidden causes of the phenomena which are the objects of
experience appeaj^to us radically inaccessible to the
human faculties.
The conflict between Mill's realism and his nominalism is further les-^
sened if we understand that the particulars in the theory of the syllo-
gism are, from Mill's viewpoint, the sensations of states of conscious-
ness produced by the universal laws of nature. Thus Mill's deductive or
ratiocinative method should actually be less uncertain than he admits,
while his 'inductive method, with its reliance on rationalist assumptions,
provides nothing approaching proof or certainty.
The overwhelming tendency of Mill's philosophy supports the view
that inductive generalizations can never be fully proved. Even when em-
pirical laws are connected by deduction with previously postulated laws
of nature, they must still be only approximations of an unknowable reality.
What, then, is to be gained by the postulation of universal laws? To
answer this, we must understand that Mill's dual motivation in refining
methodology was to both demolish the intellectual stranglehold which in-
tuitionism held on moral reasoning and to establish a new scientific basis
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for moral and political theory. Thus his efforts to develop a theory of
inductive proof were aimed at depriving intuitionism of "the appeal it
is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and of the cognate
branches of physical science." Yet despite his adherence to 'the
school of Locke and Bentham'
,
Mill was not an empiricist. He always
maintained that while experience furnishes all the material of knowledge,
experience must be connected with universal laws before it can provide a
suitable basis for understanding.
Being unable to examine the actual contents of our con-
sciousness until our earliest, which are necessarily our
most firmly knit associations, are fully formed, we can-
not study the original elements of mind in the facts of
our present consciousness. These original elements can
only come to light as residual phenomena by a previous
study of the mental elements which are confessedly not
original.
Mill was convinced that with the concepts of sensation and associa-
tion, he had uncovered the basis for a science of the formation of charac-
ter. Furthermore, since "human beings in society have no properties but
those which are derived from and may be resolved into, the laws of the
nature of man," Mill holds that "the laws of the phenomena of society
are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of
27
human beings united together in the social state." Thus social science
will be deductive because it begins with "the laws of nature of individual
man". Social science cannot be inductive because in social affairs, a
"p lurality of causes exists in almost boundless excess and effects are
for the most part inextricably interwoven with one another." Yet Mill
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does not dismiss the role of observation and experience in social science.
He notes that
the ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science
is not the a priori reasoning itself, but the accordance
between its results and those of observation a posteriori.
Either of these processes, apart from the other, diminishes
in value as the subject increases in complication.
We may conclude that Mill's logic and scientific method are built
around a synthesis of a realist and nominaliS;t theory of universals
and also aosynthesis of an
^
priori and an experientialist theory of
knowledge. The connecting thread for this curious amalgam is Mill's
cosmology; Nature is an arena of orderly cause and effect relations.
Consciousness, fully a part of this natural process, can register sen-
sations and make associations, but the laws of the universe; '.are effect-
ively removed from the realm of certain knowledge. We must rely on
experience and observation, but, at the same time, we will be unable
to decipher Nature without tfaeoadd of, a. prioric reasoning. Paradoxically
then. Mill's commitment to experience does not deny the existence of
universal laws, nor does his commitment to a priori postulates deny
the necessity of observation. Mill's fundamentally rationalist cos-
mology combined with his experientialist epistemology allows him to
have it both ways.
Turning now to Mill's ethics, we find similar conflicts apparent
in his writings. His cosmology leads to a thoroughly naturalistic view
of man as a locus of interacting laws of nature. Mill was thus
drawn to
a deterministic view of man and a relativistic view of knowledge.
At
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the same time, however, he admired the free-will doctrine for "keeping
in view precisely that portion of the truth which the word Necessity puts
out of sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation
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of its own character."
Mill s appreciation of free-will does not, however, prevent him from
asserting the determining effect of circumstances in the last instance;
Our character is formed by us as well as for us; but the
wish which induces us to attempt to reform it is formed
for us... by our experience.
Thus we do have the power to alter our character so long as we wish to
use it, and Mill places a moral obligation upon mankind to alter both
the conditions of existence and individual character.
The duty of man is to co-operate with the beneficient
powers (of nature)
,
not by imitating but by perpetually
striving to amend the course of nature—and bringing
that part of it over which they can exercise control
more nearly into donformity with a high standard of
justice and goodness.
The artificially created, or at least artificially per-
fected, nature of the best and noblest human beings,
the only nature which it is ever commendable to follow.
By what standard would Mill have men determine the ethically superior
role models and conditions of existence? Again, we find apparent conflict.
Mill seemingly wants a deductive ethics; he stresses the need for a first
principle in moral philosophy if human conduct is to be rationally justi-
fied;
There must be some standard by which to determine the
goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of ends
or objects of desire. And whatever that standard is,
there can be but one; for if there were several ulti—
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mate principles of conduct, the same conduct might be
approved by one of those principles and condemned by
another; and there would be needed, some more general
principle as umpire between them.
The standard Mill proposes is, of course, the principle of utility. Yet
he is unwilling to accept its Benthamite version; Bentham’is abstract de-
ductive reasoning was based on an overly simplified account of a complex
empirical reality. Mill noted that under Bentham’s influence, progres-
sive thought had become "abstract and metaphysical", while conservative
thought, as exhibited by Coleridge, at least had the strength of being
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"concrete and historical". Utilitarianism tended to ignore the aspi-
rations and experiences of individuals in its determination of rights
and duties. Mill's introduction of the doctrine of Individuality and
of qualitative distinctions between pleasures was intended to make Utili-
tarianism more concrete and inductive rather than, as mo^t critics have
claimed, to inject a rational or metaphysical element into Bentham's
philosophy. The confusion arises from the supposition that Mill wanted
a standard of pleasureas a basis for a deductive ethics and hence a justi-
fication for a reorganization of society along elitist lines. Quite to
the contrary, he objected to modeling moral science after Newtonian phy-
sics. According to Mill, the task of the scientist in the moral disci-
plines is to develop empirical laws on the basis of observation and then
verify these laws by deducing them from the postulated laws of human na-
ture. But the empirical laws cannot determine the correct behavior for
an individual nor the correct policy for a legislator because they
can
only be applied to the fulfillment of separately determined
ethical ends.
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The formulation of these ends falls under the category of Art rather than
Science.
Mill's ethics can be described as concrete and inductive in yet
a more fundamental way. Mill was willing to grant the validity of the
principle of utility only if utility was "grounded on the permanent in-^
terests of man as a progressive being." At the same time, he was
unwilling to define the content of these interests since to do so would
require a purely deductive ethics. Mill's solution was to encourage a
diversity of lifestyles and let experience prove which ones are superior.
The worth of different modes of life should be proved
practically .. .Unless there is a corresponding diversity
in their modes of life, (men) neither obtain their fair
share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral,
and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.
Implicit in Mill's proposal is the asumption that individuals, in their
drive to maximize utility, will compare personalities and lifestyles ex-
hibited by others when choosing their own. More importantly, the cogency
of Mill's position depends on the further assumption that individuals
exposed to different lifestyles will indeed choose those which are
ethically superior. In a sense, this second assumption is tautological,
since Mill proposes that in any situation of choice between Alternatives,
"the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or if they
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differ, that of the majority amongst them, must be admitted as final."
Thus the fact that certain lifestyles are popular should serve as prima
facie evidence of their ethical superiority, but Mill is uncomfortable
with such extremeiiirelativisra. In its present imperfect condition, society
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does not afford many individuals the opportunity to experience diversity
and thus be cognizant of preferred lifestyles. The pressure for conform-
ity is immense and tends to stifle the desire to alter one’s personality.
Thus, while knowledge of alternatives is a necessary condition for the
transformation of preference, individual initiative is the sufficient
condition. Mill believed that one or both may be absent in society.
To sum up Mill’s ethics, i.then, we may recognize the potential incomr
patibility of his varying degrees of commitment to deductive and inductive
methods, determinist and free-will doctrines, and experientialist and
rationalist criteria of right. Yet underlying these tensions is Mill’s
unwavering commitment to the belief that Nature, including man, is more
that just exhibited phenomena. It includes ”t'he unused capabilities of
causes... as much... as those which take effect.” The moral duty of man-
kind is to fully realize the potential inherent in Nature, but to fulfill
this obligation, both knowledge and desire are necessary. We must not
fall into
the error of expecting that the regeneration of mankind, if
practibable at all, is to be brought about exclusively by
the cultivation of what (many of our social reformers) some-
what loosely term the reasoning faculty; forgetting. . .that,
even supposing perfect knowledge to be attained, no good
will come of it, unless the ends, to^^hich the means have
been pointed out, are first desired.
The realization of Nature’s potential must be pursued artistically
as well as scientifically, inductively as well as deductively. The good
society will both reflect individual desires and facilitate the develop-
ment of new and superior desires. Mill is a moral relativist to the
ex-
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tent that he acknowledges man's inability to discern an objective criterion
is an absolutist insofar as he believes that competition
among diverse views must converge on a superior position. This fundamental
necessity for diversity leads Mill to the belief that moral advancement rC'
liberty, and that liberty, in turn, must be based on justice. In
the following section, I shall analyze Mill's theory of justice.
Ill
Mill came to intellectual maturity in an increasingly polarized politi-
cal environment. The natural harmony of interests doctrine had been dis-
credited, but without it, liberal social theory was adrift; there was no
longer an ethical basis for laissez faire, yet neither were there any func-
tional norms to guide alternative policies. Having eliminated any basis
for the ^ priori determination of rights, the Utilitarians themselves could
not offer an effective criterion for the weighing of consequences. Thus
the Benthamite theory of justice made the definitions of right and just the
objects of social conflict.
Mill was acutely aware of the ideological vacuum left by Bentham and
of the urgency of filling that vacuum in the face of the increasing challenge
of socialism;
Even those who take the most unfavorable view of the changes
in our social arrangements which are demanded with increasing
energy on behalf of the working classes, would be wise to
consider that when claims are made which are partly just and
partly beyond the limits of justice, it is no less politic
than honest to concede with a good will all that is just, and
take their defensive stand on the line, if they able to
find it, which separates justice from injustice.
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In order to understand how Mill drew the line between justice and injustice,
we begin with his principle of liberty which may be expressed as follows:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any m^^ber of a civilized community is to prevent harm
to others.
Clearly, the cogency of this principle requires some specification of what
sorts of disutilities experienced by others are to be counted as ’harm'.
Mill states that any psychic disutility arising from actions which are
merely offensive to another persons values must be tolerated and cannot
serve as grounds for an infringement of liberty. The closest Mill comes
to defining ’harm’ is a reference to "injuring the interests of .. .another. .
.
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which ought to be considered as rights." But this leaves us in no better
position than before; we now need a definition of rights.
The Benthamite notion of rights is too vague for Mill because it leaves
the individual open to possible subjugation in the interest of advancing
social utility. In their short-sightedness, legislators may give insufficient
weight to the benefits over time of maintaining diversity. Yet Mill was
determined not to abandon the principle of utility since without it, morality
would lose the essential single criterion of right. The dilemma facing Mill
is thus to define rights and explain the claims of justice in utilitarian
terms while simultaneously defending an absolute principle of liberty and
developing a theory of justice which conforms with common notions linking
rewards to merit or desert.
Mill approaches the task by acknowledging that justice is frequently
thought of as having a basis in natural instincts and thus posing an alter-
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native criterion of right to the principle of utility. Mill even agrees
that the original source of the sense of justice is the animal desire for
retaliation which comes from ’’the impulse of self-defence and the feeling
of sympathy.” But these sentiments are not, in themselves, moral and do
not become so until they are;
united with a conviction that the infliction of punishment
in such case is conformable to the general good, and when
the impulse is not allowed, to carry us beyond the point at
which the conviction ends.
When the sentiments underlying the sense of justice have been fully moralized,
we will observe
just persons resenting a hurt to society, though not other-
wise a hurt to themselves, and not resenting a hurt to them-
selves, however painful, unless it be of the kind which soci-
ety has a common interest with them in the repression of.^^
So far. Mill has only shown that mankind has the capacity to develop
a sense of justice. He still needs to explain the requirements of justice
and to prove that they do not conflict with the principle of utility. In
an effort to differentiate the requirements of justice from other moral
obligations. Mill claims that justice entails ’’duties of perfect obligation...
6in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons.”
This is hardly a satisfactory explanation of justice; to say that the rules
of justice are transgressed when a person’s rights have been violated is
tautological and hence vacuous. However, Mill subsequently clarifies his
position
;
When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has
a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of
it, either by force of law, or by that of education and opinion.
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We begin to suspect that we are being led in a circle, but Mill does ex-
palin that these 'valid claims’ may arise on the basis of formal laws or
simply from a tacit understanding concerning consideration among persons.
If laws are violated, the government should intervene, but for the mere
disappointment of a legitimate expectation, "the offender may... be punished
by opinion, though not by law." Mill warns of the danger of allowing
government to punish violations of justice which do not break the law;
We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and injustice
repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, with
reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited
an amount of power over individuals.
Does Mill's theory of justice, then, effectively reduce to a Hobbesian
positive law theory where civil laws become the criterion of right? Not
at all. Mill admits the possibility of unjust laws and differentiates be-
tween moral rights and legal rights. Positive laws, and indeed all social
rules, derive their ultimate legitimacy from their contribution to social
utility. Known and rigid rules are expedient because they both simplify
moral choice and encourage moral behavior;
As mankind are much more nearly of one nature, than of one
opinion about their own nature, they are more easily brought
to agree in their^^ntermediate principles ... than in their
first principles.
To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others
develops the feelings an^^^capacities which have the good of
others for their object.
However, Mill finds the greatest utility of rules of justice to be their
contribution to security;
We depend on (security) for all our immunity from evil, and
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for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the
passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of
the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could
be deprived of everything the next instant by whoever
was momentarily stronger than ourselves. ^
Now, either Hobbes or Bentham could have offered a nearly identical
explanation of justice, so we have clearly not yet uncovered the unique
aspect of Mill s theory. Mill’s contribution may be described as charting
a middle course between Hobbes and Bentham so that security is not given
such priority that the rules of justice become inflexible and, at the same
time, expediency is not permitted to dictate violations of common-sense
notions of justice as fairness. Thus we find Mill warning of;
the error of setting up such unbending principles, not
merely as universal rules for attaining a given end,
but as rules of conduct generally; without regard to
the possibility, not only that some modifying cause
may prevent the attainment of the given end by the
means which the rule prescribes, but that success it-
self may conflict with some other which may pos-
sibly chance to be more desirable.
Mill believed that the dictates of justice cannot be static because they
are at least partially a function of the social environment;
The entire history of social improvement has been a
series of transitions, by which one custom or institu-
tion after another, from being a supposed primary ne-
cessity of social existence, has passed into the ran^^
of an universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny.
Having avoided the Scylla of security. Mill still needs to steer clear
of the Charybdis of expediency if the dictates of justice are to possess
the firm commitment to fairness demanded by men’s natural sentiments. To
compound the difficulty, justice as fairness must be subsumed under, or at
least made consistent with, the principle of utility if Mill is to avoid
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having two competing criteria of right. It is precisely this latter con-
dition which some critics claim Mill cannot possibly meet; a distributive
ideal, they say, cannot logically be subsumed under an aggregative one.^^
In a static sense the critics are right, but Mill is concerned with the
dynamic maximization of utility and hence with the development of capacities
for pleasure as well as the satisfaction of existing desires. According
to Mill, the essential conditions for the development of human potential
are an awareness of superior preference structures and a desire to attain
them. These conditions, in turn, require for their fulfillment a diversity
of lifestyles and personalities, which can only flourish in a fair and
just society. Thus fairness is both central to and consistent with Mill’s
principle of utility.
The exact manner in which justice fosters utility will bear some further
examination. Mill's rejection of both Bentham and Ricardo was motivated by
his perception that neither of them effectively appealed to the individual
aspirations of persons. In Ricardo's case, the conditions of justice were
imposed by immutable laws of nature, while Bentham' s utilitarianism left
the individual's fate in the handsof societal calculations of pleasure and
pain. Both theories viewed the requirements of justice as something imposed
(by nature or society) on the individual and then sought to legitimize the
constraints. Mill, on the other hand, believed that justice can only be
realized when individuals actively aspire to initiate programs of self-
development based on the expectation of increasing their capacities for
enjoyment in the future;
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Morality consists of two parts. One of these is self-
education the training by the human being himself, of
his affects and will... The other and co—equal part,
the regulation of his outward actions, must be alto-
gether halting and imperfect without the first.
This requirement that self—development be a preferred goal carries with
it major implications for both the political and economic contours of
society. In the next section, I shall examine the nature of social insti-
tutions dictated by Mill’s theory of justice.
IV
If ethically superior preference structures are to emerge, different
lifestyles and personalities must compete on a fair basis. Mill was not so
idealistic as to believe that virtuous, but economically nonviable, lifestyles
would be deemed worthy of emulation by large numbers of people. Thus the
focus of his economics was the determination of those conditions under which
society’s rewards would be distributed so as to foster the maximum develop-
ment of human capacities and hence the most rapid possible expansion of
social utility. For Mill, distributive justice was backward-looking in the
sense that reward should correspond with merit, but this theory of justice
was ultimately forward-looking because merit should reflect the potential
as well as the realized development of capacities.
The theoretical task which Mill set for himself may be summarized as
follows: which aspects of a capitalist economy are consistent with the
encouragement of human development and which aspects suppress development
.
Mill predicted that ’’attacks on private property" would continue until
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the laws of property are freed from whatever portion of injustice they
contain. He sought to demonstrate that private property has "no neces-
sary connection with all the physical and social evils which almost all
socialist writers assume to be inseparable from it."^®
Competition was the most attractive aspect of capitalism for Mill.
In order to show that competitive market exchanges are consistent with
justice, he, like Smith and Ricardo, was attracted to the labor theory of
value; "the value of commodities, therefore, depends principally .. .on the
59quantity of labour required for their production." However, Mill could
not accept Ricardo’s simplifying assumption of equal ratios of capital to
labor in all industries. Thus he concluded that costs of production would
not be proportional to the labor embodied in different commodities. To
resolve this problem. Mill adopted the subjective approach to real cost
which had been initiated by Smith and Nassau Senior. This approach treats
the abstinence of the capitalist who refrains from present consumption as
a disutility comparable to labor and hence equally deserving of compensation;
As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour,
so the profits of the capitalist are properly, according to
Mr. Senior’s well-chosen expression, the remuneration of ab-
stinence. They are what he gains by forbearing to consume
his capitaifor his own uses, and allowing it to be consumed
by productive labourers fgg their uses. For this forbearance
he requires a recompense.
By maintaining the distinction between the physical productiveness of
the factors of production and the rewards accruing to their owners. Mill
could defend that part of property income which called forth abstinence,
skill, and energy while condemning income accruing to inherited or landed
Ill
wealth. Thus he recommended stiff inheritance taxes but opposed progres-
sive taxation;
to tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the
smaller, is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to im-
pose a penalty on people for having worked harder and
saved more than their neighbors.
Mill would have favored appropriation of land by the State, but he foresaw
a greater potential for injustice arising from State power than from private
ownership of land;
the land ought to belong to the nation at large, but I
think it will be a generation or two before the progress
of public intelligence and morality will permit so great
a concern to be entrusted to public authorities without
greater abuses than necessarily attach to private property
in land.
While Mill was attracted by the incentives and reward structure associ-
ated with competition, he condemned the injustice of the existing distribu-
tion of rewards;
The distinction between rich and poor, so slightly connected
as it is with merit and demerit, or even with exertions g^d
want of exertion in the individual, is obviously unjust.
Mill attributed the bulk of injustice to an exogenous historical factor
—
the forcible and fraudulent seizing of land and wealth prior to the strict
observance of contractual rights. He was unwilling to advocate the expro-
priation of property acquired through improper means, but he favored pro-
grams aimed at dispersing wealth such as inheritance taxes, universal edu-
cation, and limitations on the rate of population growth. Mill even sup-
ported the trade union movement in their efforts to bargain for higher
wages. Having rejected the Classical notion of the wages-fund, he believed
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that unions could be effective in raising the total income going to the
laboring class.
Distributive equity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
competition among alternative lifestyles. Just as an unfair distri-
bution of rewards would undermine the viability of potentially superior
practices, so would government suppression of individual liberties. Thus
Mill defended an absolute principle of liberty which permits intervention
only when one persons actions infringe on the rights of others. As we have
seen, Mill's principle of liberty rests on the definition of rights developed
in his theory of justice. The only rights whose violation demands interven-
tion are those established by civil law. These laws, in turn, ought to pro-
tect those individual claims on society which serve to maximize the expan-
sion of social utility. Clearly, then. Mill's principle of liberty is not
a defense of 'absolute' liberty, but rather a principle which ought to be
applied absolutely in the defense of those liberties deemed advantageous
to society.
Many critics claim to have detected a fatal flaw in Mill's principle
of liberty. They view Mill as being forced to choose between an absolute
principle of liberty (in which case he becomes a libertarian) or a principle
of liberty which defends only those interests which advance social utility
(in which case he becomes a moral totalitarian) . Yet Mill falls into neither
of these simplistic models; he doesn't defend 'absolute liberty, and, at
the same time, he doesn't claim any a priori method for determining precise-
ly which rights and interests ought to be protected. For Mill, utility
must
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be "grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being,"
and he admits that the nature of these interests will only gradually become
evident as mankind progresses through experience.
The obvious objection to Mill is to ask who will determine the legit-
imate rights and interests at any particular time. The theoretical elegance
of a concept like "the permanent interests of man as a progressive being"
does not preclude the necessity of rigid laws based on specified rights.
With his forward-looking, dynamic criterion of right. Mill could not follow
his Classical predecessors in relying on the market mechanism as the source
of the standard of value; market values simply reflect the expression of
existing desires which may or may not be consistent with man’s 'permanent
interests’. Thus Mill turned to the political process as an arena for the
rational determination of the proper ends of society.
The tension in Mill’s political theory is a reflection of an underlying
conflict between his rationalist cosmology and his experientialist episte-
mology. On one hand. Mill believed that Nature, including man, is rife
with unrealized potential, but, on the other hand, he claims that man can
have no direct access to knowledge of the ultimate state of Nature. Thus
Mill wavers between an elitist view of politics whereby the more knowledgeable
members of society fashion laws designed to maximize utility, and a democrat-
ic view which will permit popular judgement based on experience to guide
society.
Mill’s elitist tendencies are most pronounced when he voices his pessi-
mism concerning the rationality of the massess. He expressed admiration for
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the toryism of Wordsworth and Coleridge which was;
duly sensible that it is good for man to be ruled;
to Submit both his body and mind to the guidance of
a higher intelligence and virtue.
In contrast;
liberalism, which is for making every man his own
guide and sovereign master, and letting him think
for himself and do exactly as he judges best for
himself (is based on a) ... thorough ignorance of
man’s nature, and of what is necessary for his hap-
piness or what degree of^^appiness and virtue he
is capable of attaining.
Mill envisioned political leaders who were dispassionate and knowledgeable.
In On Liberty
,
he argued that the only means by which the masses could rise
above mediocrity was ’’by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted
and intructed One or Few."^^
Yet Mill also exhibited strong democratic tendencies; in Cons iderat ions
on Representative Government
,
he makes two strong defenses of democracy.
the ideally best form of government is that in which
the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the
last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the
community; every citizen not only having a voice in
the exercise of the ultimate sovereignty, but being,
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual
part in the government, by the personal discharge of
some public function, local or general.
the only government which can fully satisfy all the
exigencies of the social state is one in which the
whole people participate; that any participation,
even in the smallest public function, is useful; that
the participation should everywhere be as great as
the general degree of improvement of the community
will allow, and that nothing less can be ultimately
desirable than the admission all to share in the
sovereign power of the State.
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Both of these statements contain qualifying phrases, but Mill's attraction
to democracy was authentic and more than just a facade to mask capitalist
inequality. He believed that participation was itself an important element
in raising the general level of intelligence.
Having stressed the value of participation. Mill sought to defend in-
equality of participation. Equal voting is, from Mill's viewpoint,
in principle wrong, because recognizing a wrong standard,
and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind. It
is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of the
country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as
much political power as knowledge.
To guard against equal voting. Mill advocated plural voting whereby the more
successful members of society would be allowed two or more votes. He
suggested that inequality in participation should not disturb the common
man if "this superior influence should be assigned on grounds which he can
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comprehend, and of which he is able to perceive the justice." Thus Mill
believed that plural votes should be granted on the basis of education rather
than ownership of property.
In comparing Mill's political and economic theories, an analogy emerges
which reflects the central importance of justice in virtually all of his
work. Mill does not oppose unequal advantages when theycorrespond to rele-
vant inequalities of merit. In the economic sphere, the criterion of merit
is sacrifice and contribution as measured by either labor or abstinence. In
the political sphere, the criterion of merit is intellectual and moral contri-
bution as measured by level of education and range of experience. In both
spheres. Mill opposed any "inequality of privilege grounded on irrelevant
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or adventitious circumstances."^^
The ambiguities which appear so evident in Mill's writings on poli-
tics and economics cannot be resolved without penetrating into his moral
philosophy and particularly his theory of justice. There we discover that
the conflicts between positive and negative freedom, laissez faire and in-
tervention, elitism and democracy, and an adding-up theory of value and a
subjective real cost theory of value all boil down to a basic dilemma; an
objective truth exists but we have no way to discover it except through
experience. Because he believed in an objective criterion of right. Mill
supported a positive notion of freedom, state intervention, elitism, and a
subjctive real cost theory of value. All of these were designed to ascertain
and fulfill the requirements of justice.
At the same time. Mill believed that the objective criterion of right
could only become evident through a gradual competitive process whereby al-
ternative lifestyles, characters, and ideas proved their worth in practice
and hence became desired ends for the mass of people. In other words, the
objective criterion of right could only function in society when individuals
came to it through their own initiative and found it congruent with their
subjective aspirations. This perspective leads Mill to support a negative
conception of liberty, laissez faire, democracy, and an adding-up theory of
value
.
The tensions in Mill's theory are no more than the tension between
being and becoming. Humans are simultaneously bundles of desires
whose inter
and self-conscious entities who have aests lie in fulfilling those desires
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strong interest in realizing their potential capacities. In deference to
the autonomy of the individual, the good society must recognize the legiti-
macy of and seek to satisfy the desires of its citizens. When Mill takes
perspective, he is a thorough realist and utilitarian. However, the
good society must also foster the development of superior personalities,
and to do this, judgements must be made by both individuals and legislators
as to the rightness and wrongness of actions and the truth or falsity of
opinions. For this task. Mill proposed the only standard available to a
theorist who has cut himself off from any reliance on innate instincts, rea-
son, or intuition; experience alone could instruct men in the fashioning of
higher ends. Yet Mill’s notion of experience, as described in the second
section of this chapter, dictates that perceptions alone cannot give know-
ledge. Experienced phenomena can be understood only by by linking them
with the natural laws embodied in Mill’s cosmos. Hence judgement requires
prior knowledge; only the highly educated minority is capable of ascertain-
ing right and wrong.
We might conclude that Mill succeeded in developing an internally con-
sistent and coherent theory of justice. He correctly perceived the require-
ment of postulating an objective criterion of right on which subjective in-
tentions might reasonably be assumed to converge. He was perhaps the first
liberal theoretician to recognize that individual desires are the product
as well as the cause of social institutions. In a period of intense class
conflict, he saw the wisdom of limited abrogations of property rights and
universal suffrage on one hand, and the protection of earned privileges and
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minority opinions on the other hand. Mill can be compared to the captain
of a ship which is heading into uncharted waters. He wants to deliver his
safely to the most ideal terrain, but he doesn't know in advance where
this piece of land is located or what it looks like. He welcomes the assis-
tance of his officers who are on the deck with him examiningthe different
landing sites. He even believes that the decision would be aided by other
opinions, but the deck can only accomodate a limted number of persons. How-
ever, he has ordered the crew members who work below to enlarge the deck so
that gradually they can come up to assist in charting the course of the ship.
In fact, the captain strongly suspects that the ideal site won't be known
until all the ship's crew had had an opportunity to participate in the deci-
sion. However, the limited size of the deck prohibits this for the present,
and so the task of the captain and his officers is to steer the boat in the
right direction while encouraging the enlargement of the deck.
This metaphor captures Mill's conflicting commitments to democracy and
elitism, social equality and privilege. The resolution, for Mill, requires
time. In the interim, public education, higher standards of living, and
perhaps most importantly, restraints on population growth are prerequisites
to a just society. By appealing to a future just society while upholding
the basic institutions of existing society as being essential to achieving
the future society. Mill would appear to have developed not only an intern-
ally consistent, but also a viable theory of justice. Yet it is on the
issue of viability that Mill's theory encounters its fatal weakness.
The cogency of Mill's theory of justice requires the functioning of a
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private morality which stresses the principle of self-realization. More-
o'v&T
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if ethically superior personalities are to be consistently preferred,
the basis on which individuals assess alternative personalities must be
independent of the system by which expressed desires are satisfied. In
short. Mill must assume that the system of rewards effected by the competitive
market is congruent with the choice of ethically superior personalities.
Several objections may be raised against this assumption. First, the com-
petitive market economy develops according to efficiency critera, and hence
those personalities oriented toward abstinence, labor, and material rewards
will be reinforced by the market. Second, market efficiency may dictate a
structure of work in which narrow and routinized tasks are promoted at the
expense of more stimulating and fulfilling work experiences. Again, the
personalities which are compatible with routine work will be rewarded and
hence will, at least to some extent, become preferred role models.
The foregoing criticisms would not apply to Mill if he claimed that
the personality types engendered by the competitive market were indeed
ethically superior. But Mill denies this;
I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held
out by those who think that the normal state of human
beings is that of struggling to get on; that the tramp-
ling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's
heels, which form the existing type of social life, are
the most desirable lost of human kind, or anything but
the disagreeably j^symptoms of one of the phases of indus-
trial progress.
At one point. Mill actually abandoned his appeal to individual initiative
in the choice of preferred lifestyles;
120
That the energies of mankind should be kept in em-
ployment by the struggle for riches .. .until the bet-
ter minds succeed in educating the others into better
things, is undoubtedly more desirable than that they
should rust and stagnate. While minds are course,
they require course stimuli, and let them have thera.^^
This statement illuminates the essential conflict between Mill's theory of
justice and the operation of a capitalist economy. In his effort to legiti-
mize the system of private property and individual competition. Mill must
destroy the coherency of his theory of justice. He consistently denied that
rectitude could be imposed on persons j the individual must actively
aspire to develop a superior personality and this desire can come only from
personal assessments of the worth of competing lifestyles. Yet Mill now
admits that in the present society, the mass of men are doomed to a narrow
and uninspiring existence;
Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical in-
ventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any
human being. They have enabled a greater population
to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment,
and an increased ni^^ber of manufacturers and others
to make a fortune.
Mill's theory of justice is not viable for a laissez faire capitalist
economy, and thus his ultimate recourse is an appeal to rational and disin-
terested politicians who will undertake the interventions required to main-
tain justice. However this solution runs afoul of Mill's observations on
the effect of class power on political decisions;
In every country where there are rich and poor, the
administration of public affairs would, even under
the most democratic constitution, be mainly in the
hands of the rich. . .Political power will generally
be the rich man's privilege, as heretofore. ^
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Moreover, it cannot be supposed that the rich will rule wisely and benevo-
lently;
All privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used
their power in the interest of their own selfishness, and
have indulged theirseIf
-importance in despising, and not in
lovingly caring for, those who were, in their estimation,
degraded, by being under the necessity of working for their
benefit. I do not affirm that what has always been must
always be, . . .but though the evil may be lessened, it cannot
be eradicated, until the power itself is withdrawn.
If politics must remain class-biased until the power of the privileged
class is withdrawn, then Mill as much as admits that State intervention
cannot be the source of justice.
In the final analysis. Mill's belief that the system of private prop-
erty and individual competition is necessary to the realization of justice
can be reduced to his optimistic, and rather unfounded, opinion that edu-
cation and knowledge would free men from class prejudices and that the
'united authority of the instructed' would prevail over the divisive and
narrow interests of the classes. Mill's optimism stems from his faith in
an objective criterion of right, but we must remember that Mill denied that
reason could bring men to a consensus on this criterion. Instead, he re-
lied on experience, yet he does not show that the experience of living in
a class society will foster a widespread commitment to the objective cri-
terion of right. Maurice Cowling offers an insightful description of
Mill's optimism;
Mill's situation, as a highly articulate, intellectually
ambitious member of a middle—class , literary intelligentsia
with little opportunity to exercise open, conventional po-
litical power, made it likely that his claims to political
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authority would be based
,
if based on authority they were,
on intellectual rather than social superiority. Looked at
from one point of view, that is what his moral and politi-
cal writings are—claims to supersede leadership based on
social, by leadership based on intellectual, superiority.^^
I conclude that the viability of Mill's theory of justice for a capi-
talist economy is shattered by an incapacity to deal with the on-going re-
ality of class conflict. An adequate theory must demonstrate the material
conditions under which class conflict would disintegrate as men reached mut-
ual agreement on a criterion of right. Instead, Mill simply posits the
erosion of class divisions as a precondition for the realization of justice.
Thus, despite the underlying unity of his thought and his valuable contri-
butions to the liberal theory of justice, John Stuart Mill, like Locke and
Smith before him, was unable to offer a satisfactory legitimation of capi-
talist society.
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CHAPTER IV
JOHN RAWLS AND THE DEMISE OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE
After 1870, the rapidly declining authority of John Stuart Mill's
social theory reflected more than just the rejection of Classical politi-
cal economy. Mill marked the end of a liberal tradition which offered
both an empirical analysis of a private, market society and an unabashed
justification of that society as the only rational form of organization
for realizing the most rapid and extensive development of human capa-
cities. After Mill, changing material conditions created increasing ten-
sion between analysis and legitimation.
Classical liberalism was based on the assumption of free competition
between self-interested persons with ground-rules laid down by a neutral
State. With the rise of a working class movement, increasing monopoliza-
tion of the economy, and the growth of State power, the tension between
the ideals of classical liberalism and the reality of contemporary liberal
society proved to be greater than a single theoretical framework could
bear. Thus out of Mill's work emerged the two rival strands of modem
liberalism. The humanistic vision of classical liberalism was incorpor-
ated in the idealist political theory initiated by Hegel and developed by
T.H. Green. In contrast, neoclassical economic theory retained the
hedonistic and empiricist aspects of Utilitarianism.
The conflict between the two strands is exemplified by the efforts
of each school of thought to claim Mill as a member. Green claimed that
Mill had really deserted the hedonistic calculus of Utilitarianism in
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favor of a self-realization principle, while Sidgewick. observed that
the distinctions of quality that Mill and others urge
may still be admitted as grounds of preference, but
only in so far as they can be resolved into distinc-
tions of quantity.
I shall argue that the strength and coherency of liberal social
theory has been seriously undermined by the schism which developed
during the late nineteenth century. My interest here is primarily with
the difficulties faced by neoclassical economists as they sought to
develop rational norms for the organization of society while explicitly
rejecting both the existence of and the need for an objective criterion
of right. They have either consciously avoided the topic of justice or
else have sought to smuggle considerations of justice into their theories
disguised as scientific analysis. The latter tactic has inevitably been
discredited by more intellectually honest colleagues, while the former
has become increasingly untenable in light of both the internal and ex-
ternal challenges to the legitimacy of liberal societies.
Given these developments, it is hardly surprising that John Rawls
recent attempt to synthesize the rationalist and empiricist strands of
liberalism has been received with widespread interest if not approval.
In constructing his theory, Rawls has judiciously returned to the social
contract traditions, yet, at the same time, he affiliates himself meth-
odologically with neoclassical welfare economics and the formal rigor
which accompanies that tradition. As if the foregoing combination were
not sufficiently heterogeneous, Rawls infuses his entire work with
Kant-
ian ethics.
130
I maintain that his peculiar amalgam of various aspects of the
liberal tradition is incomprehensible without an appreciation of the
historical development of both liberal societies and liberal theories
of justice. Rawls has been criticized for illogic and internal incon-
sistency, but the ultimate test of his theory must be its viability as
a description and legitimation of a liberal society in which rewards
and duties would be distributed in such a way as to foster continual af-
firmation of that society by its members.
As a prelude to analyzing Rawls' theory, I shall devote the first
section of this chapter to the series of unsuccessful attempts by neo-
classical economists to develop welfare critera based solely on consid-
erations of efficiency. Understanding the impasse reached by neoclas-
sical welfare economics will make us more appreciative of the methodology
employed by Rawls. In the second section, I shall briefly sketch Rawls'
theory of justice. The third section consists of a rather lengthy cri-
tique designed to show that Rawls has not presented a compelling argument
for obligation to a capitalist state and thus has failed to construct a
viable liberal theory of justice. Finally, I shall devote the fourth
section to some reflections on the future of theories of justice.
I
In 1871, the 'marginal revolution' ushered in neoclassical economics.
For our purposes, we may note two distinctive changes which the neoclas-
sical orientation brought to liberal notions of justice. First, rational
131
choice came to be equated with market behavior; Mill's conception of an
objective hierarchy of pleasures was scuttled. Second, all efforts to
legitimize the prevailing distribution of productive assets were osten-
sibly placed beyond the scope of economic theory. Given these develop-
ments, we might conclude that neoclassical economics has little relevance
for our historical analysis of justice. However, despite their attempts
to rigidly dichotomize positive and normative elements, neoclassical econ-
omists prior to Pareto consistently blurred this distinction. After Pareto,
considerations of equity found a home in the branch of the discipline called
welfare economics. Since this historical progression is extremely relevant
to understanding Rawls, I shall briefly summarize the efforts by neoclassical
economists to develop rational principles for the organization of society.
Jevons led the neoclassical attack of Mill's theory of justice. Mill's
objective criterion of right had peirmitted a contrast between the dictates
of justice and the prevailing pattern of distribution. Even though his
experientialist epistemology constrained him from actually judging the
ethical status of specific preference structures, the moral force of Mill's
theory of justice rested on the interpersonal comparability of pleasures.
Furthermore, it is precisely this aspect of Mill's theory which, if taken
in isolation, potentially leads to the illiberal conclusion that society
has an interest in suppressing inferior and promoting superior preference
structures. Thus Jevons and the other pioneers in neoclassical thought
may be viewed as reasserting the sovereignty of the individual during a
time when the State was becoming a contested instrumentality through
which
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group interests sought expression. Jevons explicitly rejected inter-
personal comparisons of utility; "every mind is thus inscrutable to
every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be
possible."^
Since Mill had denied the practical feasibility of comparing pre-
ference structures, we must wonder whether Jevons was motivated solely
by the noble effort to rescue the individual from Millian totalitarian-
ism or whether he simply sought to reconstruct the moral justification
for laissez faire. After all. Mill's advocacy of intervention was
severely limited, but he had raised the spectre of widespread injustice
inherent in the very institutional make-up of capitalist society. Mill
encouraged a continual questioning of the status quo and experimentation
with alternative lifestyles and even economic systems. Thus it is plaus-
ible that Jevons was concerned more with Mill's radical individualism
and the implied destabilization of the status quo than with any central-
ist tendencies which can be read into Mill's work.
Further evidence for this interpretation of Jevons 's conservatism
can be found in his reversionto a Benthamite harmony-of-interests doc-
trine. Jevons boldly stated that "the supposed conflict of labour with
capital is a delusion," and that "in economics— (we) should regard all
men as brothers (rather than looking) at such subjects from a class point
of view."^ With a harmony of interests, all exchanges must be mutually
beneficial, but Jevons makes a jump in logic to conclude that "perfect
freedom of exchange, therefore, tends to the maximizing of utility.
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Clearly, such a conclusion is relative to a given distribution of
productive assets, but Jevons makes no attempt to justify the exist-
ing distribution.
Thus we find the early neoclassical economists seeking to legit-
imize laissez faire on grounds of efficiency but then making the un-
warranted jump to arguments that an efficient allocation of resources
is ethically superior to an inefficient one. Their arguments are
couched in terms of positive analysis and they protest vigorously
against allowing ethical considerations to enter economics. Thus
Menger remarks that;
One of the strangest questions ever made the subject
of scientific debate is whether rent and interest are
justified from an ethical point of view or whether they
are "immoral” .. .VTherever the services of land and capi-
tal bear a price, it is always as a consequence of their
value, and their value to men is not the result of arbi-
trary judgement, but a necessary consequence of their
economic character.^
Menger has managed to imbue the distribution of income with an objec-
tive necessity only by assuming that the distribution of productive
assets is an objective necessity. Yet by offering no ethical justi-
fication for this latter assumption, he must certainly fail to lift
the distribution of income above the realm of moral assessment.
In addition to Jevons and Menger, Walras is usually regarded as
a founding father of the neoclassical approach. His unique contribu-
tion was to portray a competitive economy as a general equilibrium
model in which a set of simultaneous equations would yield a consis-
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tent set of prices. Yet Walras also falls prey to the temptation to
add moral force to his mathematical model j "The equations we have
developed do show freedom of production. . .procures the maximum of
utility."^ This widespread tendency to identify the outcomes of a
competitive market with a utility maximum reflects more than just an
implicit validation of the prevailing distribution of assets. The
assumptions that utility is cardinally measurable and additive also
underlie early neoclassical analysis. In fact, despite the proclaim-
ations to the contrary, these neoclassical economists were engaged in
interpersonal comparisons of utility. They were able to avoid explicit
comparisons only because theyimplicitly assumed that equal amounts of
income gave equal amounts of utility to all persons. Thus their com-
parisons of utility could be presented as comparisons of money amounts.
The problem with this assumption was that it carried the implication
that utility maximization would require a perfectly equal distribution
of income.
As neoclassical economics developed during the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, many of the presumptions of the originators
were rejected as being metaphysical or, applying Occam s razor, as
unnecessary. Edgeworth discarded the notion of equal capacities for
pleasure among all persons. Marshall and Bdhm-Bawerk claimed that
economics need have no basis in a hedonistic psychology. As the
science of rational choice, economics could drop the assumption that
what people do is necessarily good for them.
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The intention behind these revisions was the drive to make econ-
omics more scientific. Yet the unforeseen effect was to undercut
that a private, competitive economy was necessarily de-
sirable. In Schumpeter's words, the neoclassical proof that compe-
tition maximizes utility "boils down to a definition of rational
action and can be paralled by analogous theorems for a socialist
g
society." Wicksell noted that "an exchange between a rich man and
a poor man may lead to a greater total utility if it is effected at
Q
a suitably fixed price than if left to free competition."
Having effectively destroyed the normative implications of com-
petitive equilibrium and private enterprise, Marshall and Edgeworth
(and later Pigou) evaded these implications by covertly reintroducing
the notion of identical capacities for pleasure into their public
expenditure theory. Edgeworth implicitly makes such an assumption in
defending the rule of equimarginal sacrifice in taxation. Marshall's
concept of consumer's surplus is based on a specific demand curve which
must reflect the prevailing distribution of income. Any policy recom-
mendations based on the size of the consumer's surplus require the
assumption of identical capacities for pleasure if interpersonal com-
parisons of utility are to be avoided.
Our overview of the neoclassical treatment of justice would not
be complete without consideration of John Bates Clark. Perhaps more
than any other neoclassical economist, Clark was acutely aware of the
importance of applying economic theory to the problem of justice.
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If it is humanly possible to thus settle the ques-
tions at the basis of the law of wages, no scien-
bific work can be more immediately and widely bene-
ficient. These questions tend, if rightly answered,
to public order; if wrongly answered, to communism;
and, if unanswered, to agitation and peril. ^
Moreover, Clark recognized the need for an objective criterion of
right in order to justify the distribution of income. The preface
of The Distribution of Wealth begins with the following statement:
It is the purpose of this work to show that the
distribution of income of society is controlled
by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked
without friction, would give to every agent of
product
i^Y the amount of wealth which that agent
creates
.
Clark’s "productivity ethics" states that each person is morally
entitled to the marginal product of the factors of production which
he owns. Exploitation occurs whenever any factor receives income
less than its marginal product. This theory was buttressed by Wick-
steed’s proof that under certain assumptions, rewarding factors in
proportion to the marginal contribution to output would precisely
exhaust the total product.
Clark purported to show that the distribution of income depends
only on technical information embodied in the various production func-
tions that that distribution is thus independent of any specific type
of economic system. However, by listing the three factors of produc-
tion as labor, capital, and entrepreneurship, he included a type of
activity (i.e., providing capital) which is specific to a private pro-
perty system. More importantly, in referring to providing capital
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as a productive activity. Clark confused the productivity of capital
with the productivity of the capitalist. Finally, he seems to have
overlooked the fact that the existing pattern of factor endowments
will affect the marginal productivity of each factor by shaping both
the pattern of demand for final goods and the relative intensity of
employment of the various factors. Thus, despite its sophistication.
Clark’s theory fails to provide the objective criterion of right
essential to a liberal theory of justice.
Alfred Marshall was also deeply concerned with the ethical as-
pects of economics. Drawing on the notion of subjective real cost,
he substituted the term "waiting" for Senior's "abstinence". Thus
labor and waiting were the two ultimate factors of production for
Marshall. If he had proposed that waiting was productive, then he
would have followed Clark in confusing the productive contribution
of capital with the activity of the capitalist. But Marshall instead
portrayed waiting as a sacrifice comparable to labor. This view
requires some common standard by which to measure the disutility of
both labor and waiting, and Marshall suggested money could be used.
The disutility of waiting should be proportional to the increased
value of output attributable to additionalcapital since the same
interest rate needed to induce the marginal unit of saving will be
paid to borrow the marginal unity of financial capital. However,
the use of money as a measure of sacrifice fails on two counts. First,
a dollar will not represent an equal sacrifice for persons in differ-
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ent economic circumstances, and second, a uniform interest rate will
result in compensation greater than sacrifice for those persons who
would save even at a lower interest rate. Thus Marshall, too, was
unable to develop a justification for the distribution of income
that was independent of the prevailing distribution of wealth.
Neoclassical economics was approaching an impasse. The attempt
to make the theory objective by abstracting from considerations of
equity was clearly a failure. Even after dropping the utilitarian
basis of the theory, the seemingly less ambitious claim that free
competition maximized nation income (rather than social utility) was
likewise insusceptible to proof. In order to aggregate physical goods,
prices are necessary, and prices reflect the distribution of wealth.
This inability to locate an objective criterion of right should not
surprise us. Once the hedonistic underpinnings of the theory had been
dropped, the marginal utility theory of exchange value became logically
independent of any pure value theory. It contained no subjective or
objective grounding independent of the situation for which it was
supposed to serve as a criterion of right.
Into this emergingintellectual vacuum stepped Pareto. Or, perhaps
more accurately, we should say that Pareto closed the door on the con-
cerns which were rapidly draining neoclassical economics of its opti-
mistic spirit. He recognized that neoclassical analysis had been un-
successful in separating the scientific study of allocative efficiency
from the normative considerations of equity. Determined to correct
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matters, he first rejected the notion of cardinally measurable and
additive utility functions and then restricted welfare conclusions
to those that do not depend on interpersonal comparisons of utility.
His refusal to evaluate either the existing distribution of resources
or the existing state of preferences implied the acceptance of an
i^^firiite number of noncomparable optimal situations corresponding to
the infinite variety of preference structures and resource ownership.
These situations were noncomparable because a move from one to another
would require comparisons of losses and benefits between persons
—
a procedure which Pareto had ruled out.
The trouble with Pareto’s criterion was that it separated effic-
iency from equity only by refusing to consider equity at all. For
economists interested in practical policy recommendations, the Pareto
criterion was so restrictive as to permit almost no active economic
policy. After Pigou demonstrated that efficiency would be destroyed
by nonmarket interdependencies (i.e., externalities), the justification
for intervention was strengthened, and economists became increasingly
uncomfortable with the conservative implications of the Pareto criter-
ion. However, the rise of logical positivism in the 1920 's and 1930 's,
a particularly Lionel Robbins influential work on economic methodology,
raised doubts that welfare was a proper area of study for economists.
Thus, by the late 1930' s, when some economists did seek to broaden the
range over which welfare judgements could be made, they based their
analysis on Pareto’s ethically neutral criterion. The project of the
13
140
New Welfare Economics, as it came to be called, was to reinforce the
broad legitimacy of laissez faire by showing that market failures
could be remedied with delimited interference based solely on consid-
erations of efficiency. Thus Hicks and Kaldor, based on the earlier
work of Barone, proposed that an intervention could be considered to
improve efficiency if those who gain are able to compensate those who
lose and still be better off. ^ Later, Scitovsky noticed that the
Hicks-Kaldor criterion could potentially justify both an initial change
and then a subsequent change back to the original situation. Thus he
introduced a stricter test, known as the Scitovsky double-criterion,
which required that the initial change meet the Hicks-Kaldor criterion
and that the reverse change does not meet that criterion.
Neither the compensation principle nor the double-criterion
represented a significant theoretical advance. If the compensation
were actually paid, then the Hicks-Kaldor criterion would be identical
to the Pareto criterion, whereas if compensation were not paid, people
would have an incentive to hide their true preferences. Even if people
were honest, the measure of the intensity of losses and gains could
not be expressed in dollars offered or demanded without allowing the
existing distribution of income to affect the result. To accept dollars
offered or demanded as a measure of utility changes would imply that
a dollar is equally valuable to all persons—an interpersonal comparison
of utilities.
Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovsky encountered the same impasse as their
141
predecessors. The attempt to make policy recommendations solely on
considerations of efficiency is doomed to failure. The very notion
of economic efficiency is based on a given pattern of factor endow-
ments, and thus considerations of equity are necessaily attached to
most policies aimed at improving ef f iciency . Nor can this problem
be circumvented by refusing to pass judgement on the distribution of
wealth. The acceptance of the status quo is as much a normative judge-
ment as the rejection of the status quo. Thus neoclassical welfare
economists were compelled, at least in part, by the internal logic
of their discipline to admit that the efficiency criteria, and hence
the entire defense of free competition, were normatively vacuous
without a prior specification of an optimal distribution of wealth.
In addition to the compelling force of theoretical logic, the
intellectual honesty of welfare economists was undoubtedly bolstered
by the changing nature of the economy. The phenomena of increasing
monopolization, the Great Depression, and a resurgence of working class
militancy served to further undermine the notion that the outcomes of
a laissez faire economy were either natural or desirable. Keynesian
theory played an important role in demonstrating that a market economy
could suffer from too much inequality as well as from too little, thus
destroying one of the pillars in the traditional defense of inequality.
The neoclassical response to these changes came in the form of the social
welfare function developed by Bergson. Unlike the New Welfare Economics,
the social welfare function is premised on an acknowledgement that.
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in Myrdal ’ s words
;
The very attempt to study society "from the economic
point of view" makes it necessary to assume such a
unified subject and to determine it scientifically
in order to derive the general interest or general
welfare.
^
For the most part, those practicing within the tradition of the social
welfare function have been content to relegate the task of determining
an optimal distribution of initial assets to an unspecified decision-
making process outside the theoretical model. The consequences of
this inability to close the neoclassical model are far-reaching. No
matter how the social optimum is derived, its implementation involves
lump-sum transfers to achieve an equitable distribution and then mar-
ket competition to achieve allocative efficiency. By allowing equity
to assume priority over property rights, neoclassical economists have
dropped the commitment to private property as essential to the just
social order. Perfect competition is no longer portrayed as an ethi-
cal norm inferred from either natural law or utilitarianism. Markets
are to be justified solely on the basis of efficiency, and the old
arguments linking market efficiency to private property, laissez
faire, and a harmony of interests are rejected.
The social welfare function represents an acknowledgement that
the coherency of economic theory must rest on a criterion of justice.
However, welfare economics has not developed a liberal theory of jus-
tice because it has been unable to describe a procedure by which free
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and rational individuals could collectively determine a social order-
ing of alternative distributions without introducing interpersonal
comparisons of utility. In other words, as Arrow has shown, a contra-
diction exists between democratic decision-making and a public choice
rule capable of giving a transitive ordering of alternatives.^^ The
Arrow paradox is to be expected, as Winch explains;
That the political problem of social choice should
be insoluble without some means whereby individuals
can indicate strength of preference should come as
no surprise to economists, for no system of resource
allocation, through' the market or otherwise, could
function efficiently without such a mechanism.
The obstacle to attaching weights to individual preferences lies
not only with an inability to assess the intensity of desires, but
with the fact that desires would presumably reflect the interests of
persons in protecting or advancing their own position and hence would
be dependent on the prevailing pattern of factor endowments. Thus
the social welfare function, to the extent that it was formulated
democratically, ccu2d not serve as an objective criterion by which to
assess the justice of the initial distribution of assets; a different
social welfare function would correspond with each initial distribution.
The same dilemma undercuts Hochman and Rogers attempt to specify
22
the Pareto-optimal degree of income redistribution. Acknowledging
interdependence between utility functions, they argue that the optimal
redistribution in a two-person society is a function of the initial
distribution of income and the wealthier person's marginal rate of
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substitution between the utility derived from income retention and
that derived from income redistribution. However, by making the
initial distribution of income exogenous to their model, Hochman and
Rogers offer nothing in the way of an independent criterion of justice.
By the late 1960 's, neoclassical welfare economics had apparently
exhausted itself, with little to show for the effort. Its internal
weaknesses had been the subject of several penetrating and widely in-
24fluential critiques. While the concept of the social welfare function
contributed little to a liberal theory of justice, it was ideologically
costly. The inviolability of property rights was sacrificed and yet
no criterion of justice was gained; the social welfare function re-
presented an open invitation to power struggles over the distribution
of wealth and income. This vacuum in liberal theory became increasingly
problemmatic as larger numbers of individuals, groups, and classes
challenged the legitimacy of dominant institutions. In this light,
the significance of John Rawls' attempt to reformulate the liberal
theory of justice becomes apparent. In the next section, I shall sketch
his approach to the problem.
II
Rawls describes the thrust of his efforts as an attempt to con-
struct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose (utilitar-
ianism)."^^ In doing so, he reaches back to the contractarian tradi-
tion of the seventeenth century, but we should not be misled into
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treating Rawls as merely a restatement of seventeenth century liber-
1 • 26aiism. The contrast can be highlighted by reviewing the essential
points of the classical liberal theory of justice. In that tradition,
people are viewed as rational egoists who are bound only by political
or legal obligations to which they consent or to which it is reasonable
to suppose they would consent. Presumably, any loss of their full
natural liberty can be justified only in terms of enlightened self-
interest. An essential strategy of classical liberalism was to argue
that political institutions exist solely to provide the social condi-
tions in which a free market can develop and operate without constraint;
the institutions neither enhance nor detract from the advantage of
any participant in the market. Thus rational egoists should accept
political authority and its constraints because they can reap the bene-
fits of cooperation and exchange, enjoy security of the fruits of their
labor, and make no greater sacrifice of natural liberty than any other
person.
The difficulties facing modern liberal theory stem from the un-
willingness of large segments of the population to accept the universal
advantageousness of the free market. In the face of working class
unrest, the universalization of the franchise was granted with the
understanding that an expanded role for government was necessary for
the survival of liberal society. The State became a contested instru-
mentality which different classes, sectors, and groups attempted to
make serve their conflicting interests. The pluralist State served
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as a steam valve for the pressures generated by class conflict.
The changed role of the capitalist State has destroyed the coher-
ence of the classical liberal theory of obligation and justice. In
a class society with an interventionist State, political obligation
becomes a contingent matter. If the working class is weak and unor—
S^'^i^ed, the propertied class will push its advantage in seeking a
non-interventionist State. In the opposite situation, a united work-
ing class will demand large scale redistribution of social wealth if
not socialization of the means of production. Thus, once the image
of the neutrality of the State has been subverted, the classical
justification of liberal institutions collapses.
As described in the previous section, neoclassical economics has
been unable to offer any rational criteria for the structure of owner-
ship and rewards in a society in which the State plays an active role.
Similarly, liberal political theory has responded to the non-neutrality
of the State by abandoning the project of providing moral justification
for liberal societies. This trend, which was initiated by Schumpeter
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and has been developed by Dahl and others, views the capitalist
State as a process for sttling conflicts among competing interest
groups over politically distributable goods. This approach accepts
the situation of competition and compromise without offering any moral
criteria of the limits of legitimate compromise.
Rawls' reformulation of the problem of legitimacy and its solu-
tion may be seen as aresponse to the breakdown of the liberal theory
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of justice in the face of class conflict and the resulting politici-
zation of society. The historical significance of his work lies in
the fact that he follows modern liberal political and economic theory
in repudiating the doctrine of the neutrality of the State, but then
proceeds to offer a determinate criterion of justice. Rawls starts
from the premise that the basic economic and political institutions
of any society effect a pattern of distribution of relative wealth,
status, and power. The structure of this distribution is the most
profound influence on the relative life-prospects of individuals.
Therefore, the problem of legitimacy for Rawls is to demonstrate that
a specific pattern of distribution can be morally justified. He re-
jects any justification based on the notion of desert because desert
is itself a function of the institutions of society. Referring to
the unequal advantages offered by various social positions, Rawls notes;
Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s
initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be
justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or
desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevit-
able in the basic structure of any society, to which
the principles of social justice must in the first
instance apply. These principles, then, regulate
the choice of a political constitution and the main
elements of the economic and social system. The
justice of a social scheme depends essentially on
how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and
on the economic opportunities and ^gcial conditions
in the various sectors of society.
Rawls rejects merit as the criterion of justice on both moral and
empirical grounds. He claims that it is one of "the fixed points of our
p q
considered judgements" that we do not deserve our natural endowments.
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Nor do we deserve our acquired capacities to use our natural endow-
ments, to the extent that acquiring those capacities reflects the
families and status groups into which we are born. Thus neither
natural nor acquired differentials in ability to achieve entitles
anyone to a greater distributive share. If the criterion of merit
is to be repudiated, a viable substitute must be acknowledged by
every rational person as'the legitimate criterion for the design of
basic institutions. Rawls argues that there can be no objective basis
for just distributions other than that developed through a social con-
tract. In other words, since humans must formulate their own moral
principles, the principles gain objectivity only insofar as they
are the outcome of fair procedures. Assuming that all natural and
social contingencies are morally arbitrary, Rawls claims that fairness
dictates that persons must choose principles of justice from an
"original position" where a "veil of ignorance" shields them from
knowledge of the actual positions they will hold in the society upon
30
whose principles they agree.
What principles of social organization would individuals choose
in the original position? Rawls' "general conception of justice" is
quite straightforward: "All social primary goods— liberty and oppor-
tunity. income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of
31
these goods is to the advantage of the least favored." However,
Rawls quickly leaves aside the "general conception of Justice as
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Fairness” in favor of the ’’special conception” which involves two
principles of justice. The first states that ’’each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”
The second is the novel Difference Principle: ’’Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both t6 the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged. . .and attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” • Based
on the choices of individuals in the ’’original position,” the ’’special
conception” provides a lexical ordering of the principles of justice.
Equal liberty will normally be inviolable and the Difference Principle
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cannot be sacrificed for the sake of greater efficiency.
According to Rawls, the Difference Principle provides a determinate
solution to the distributional problem—the bete noire of liberal
34
welfare economics. In fact, Rawls is a neo-Paretian in the sense
that he locates the optimal distribution of income by applying the
compensation principle to an initial situation of equality. Any ad-
vantages accruing to groups of persons are morally defensible only if
those persons actually compensate others who are made relatively less
well-off
.
Ill
In order to assess Rawls' success in formulating a viable and
coherent liberal theory of justice, we must first note that the very
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meaning of the word 'liberal' has evolved beyond the definition set
forth in the preface of this work. There, I idefined a liberal society
as one in which property was privately owned and the maximum feasible
range of individual liberties prevailed. Thus neither neoclassical
welfare economics nor the Rawlsian theory of justice is necessarily
liberal; they both claim agnosticism on the virtues of private owner-
ship.
Rawls maintains that the "background institutions" dictated by his
principles of justice are compatible with either private property or
social ownership economies—the choice between the two depending upon
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each country's "circumstances, institutions, and historical traditions."
He argues that the use of markets is conducive to the stability of equal
liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and the decentralization of power,
although he acknowledges that markets must be amended by state action
were public goods and externalities are present and where distributional
outcomes fail to conform to the Difference Principle. More significantly,
Rawls recognizes that markets are not incompatible with social ownership
and thus embraces a versionof the "mixed economy"—markets plus state
intervention with public or private ownership—now current in advancec(
37
circles of liberal and socialist thought.
Given Rawls' ambivalence on the issue of property ownership, a
thorough assessment of his achievement must examine the viability of
the two principles of justice as they would function in the context of
both a state capitalist and a market socialist economy. In the former
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case, I shall argue that Rawls has given insufficient attention to
those aspects inherent in a capitalist economy which would (a) render
the model of moral development upon which Rawls bases his theory
highly implausible, and (b) cause individuals who had attained Rawlsian
consciousness to reject capitalist as an unjust social system. In the
case of market socialism, the model of moral development becomes plausible,
but, I shall argue, individuals could still not be expected to continually
affirm the Difference Principle.
Let me begin analyzing the relevance of Rawls’ theory to capitalism
by presenting his argument that a natural basis exists in human psycho-
social development for commitment to the principles of justice. Rawls
believes that a sustained commitment to justice cannot follow merely
from the dictates of reason. Commitment must be reinforced through
38the daily experiences of individuals in society. Stated differently,
social stability requires that the institutional arrangements chosen in
the "original position" function such that individuals experience "con-
gruence" between their actual desires and conformity to the principles
of justice.
Rawls believes that his principles will generate their own support
by appealing to "the general facts of moral psychology." These facts
determine sequential stages of moral development in the individual
which culminate in a capacity for a sense of justice. Maturation en-
tails passage from the morality of authority to the morality of associ-
ation and finally to the morality of principles. The morality of
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authority is that of the child, but we proceed to the morality of
association by engaging "in a system of cooperation known to be for
the advantage of all and governed by a common conception of justice.
As a consequence, we develop "the intellectual skills required to
regard things from a variety of points of view and to think of these
together as aspects of one system of cooperation."^^
Rawls then claims that we are naturally led from the morality
of association to the morality of principles since, in learning from
social interaction to adopt the perspective of others, we eventually
are able to adopt an objective perspective which is independent of
our own status and aspirations as well as those of any particular as-
sociates .
Clearly there are aspects of capitalism which serve to stifle
moral development. First, progression from the morality of authority
to the morality of association is impeded by the absence of egalitarian
economic institutions and reciprocal social interaction within the
sphere of production. Social relations are characterized by hierarchy
and by oppression of groups according to their race, sex, and class.
Thus, there is little opportunity for people to develop an ability
to see the general perspective of others.
Second, the transition to the morality of association requires
that individuals develop "a conception of the whole system of cooper-
,,41
ation that defines the association and the ends which it serves.
Such a conception is made difficult in capitalism where production
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is geared toward exchange rather than use, so that the only definable
end" served is the continual accumulation of capital and expansion
of marketable output. A sense of the social totality finds expression
only in the State, the goals of which are severely constrained by its
need to reproduce and stabilize the conditions under which market-
based accumulation can occur.
Third, the morality of association presupposes „that individuals
can identify "what it is that others largely want and desire, what are
their controlling beliefs and opinions." In capitalism, intergroup
and interpersonal antagonisms are caused by the fragmentation of the
division of labor, the limited opportunity for consolidating mutual
trust and understanding through participatory planning and decision-
making, and the often bitter competition among groups for access to
fundamentally unequal economic positions. A basic commitment to the
capitalist system precludes the perception that these antagonisms
are products of the structure of social rules; hence it tends to lead
individuals to inaccurate imputation of motives and intentions.
Since the principles of association in capitalism are fragmented
and hierarchical, it seems unlikely that maturation to the morality
of principles would occur in the manner described by Rawls. In a social
structure maintained and promulgated largely by class position, it
is difficult and unnatural for members of one class to accord equal
status to the perceptions and aspirations of another class. Hence
they are unlikely to be in a position to objectively choose principles
L54
of justice.
Putting aside the obstacles which capitalism poses for moral
development, we can locate characteristics basic to a capitalist
economy which would be objectionable to persons commited to the
Rawlsian principles of justice. Capitalism is consistentwith the
principle of equal liberties only if the separation of political and
economic spheres of social life can be sustained. Rawls is clearly
refe,rring to civil" and "political" liberties, but I maintain that
any plausible account of political liberty cannot exclude the liberty
to participate in decisions involving production. In capitalist pro-
duction, workers lose their equal liberties and are subjected to the
will of the minority who own the means of production and/or control
the production process.
Moreover, the extension of democratic principles to the produc-
tion process would have the effect of strengthening the system of total
liberties, since the experience of equal participation in decision-
making strengthens individual commitment to principles of justice. In
addition, the democratic control of production would tend to render
the formal principles of representative government a substantive reality.
For historical evidence indicates that those who control the means of
production have an inordinate influence in the political sphere, and
that decisions made in the economic sphere impose severe constraints
on the latitude of State action.
It may be argued that democratic control of production is economic-
155
inefficient, and that the structure of control is dictated by
technical necessity. There are two problems with this argument.
premise is probably false; numerous studies show that moves
toward more democratic control of production can increase output and
44job satisfaction. Second, the sacrifice of equal liberty to increased
efficiency (if liberty is taken to include participation in production
decisions) would represent a violation of Rawls' first priority rule
which place liberty above efficiency.
A further defense of Rawls' claim that the principle of equal
liberties is potentially compatible with capitalism is still possible.
The despotic organization of production could be only a contingent
aspect of capitalismwhich could be altered without rejecting capitalism
as such. But this is not the case. The reproduction and expansion of
capitalism dependson the maintenance of an adequate level of profits,
and it is precisely through the hierarchical control over workers in
the production process that surplus is extracted. Rawls has been misled
by neoclassical economic theory, which holds that profits reflect the
productivity of capital and the time preference of individuals. The
neoclassical theory of profits has been rather decisively descredited
in recent years by Cambridge economists and others who have demonstrated
. jIt deficiencies.
Liberal economic theory misconstrues the origin of profits by
treating labor as a commodity essentially identical with all other
^ac tors of production. But labor is unique in that the amount applied
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in a given production process depends, in part, on the relative
^
strengths of opposing class interests. Hence, the organization of
production must reflect essential elements of class struggle. Tra-
ditional issues such as length of the work day and the size of the
wage bill must be understood in these terras but so must the structure
of hierarchical authority, job fragmentation, wage differentials,
racism, and sexism. These are the basic characteristics of the capi-
talist firm. Work organization is the historical product of a dynamic
of interaction between technology and class relationships.
In arguing that capitalism is incompatible with the principle of
equal liberties, I have extended the notion of "basic liberties" to
include rights in control over production. Rawls, however, would most
likely reject this extension, since he describes the control of the
means of production not as a basic liberty but as a form of wealth.
But if this is the case, then the control of production becomes a pri-
mary good to which the Difference Principle would apply. Thus it
becomes necessary to my critique to show that the Difference Principle
is also incompatible with the functioning of a capitalist system.
The capitalist firm creates and/or reinforces forms of inequality
whose basic purpose is to fragment the work force in order to allow
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maintenance of control by bossess. In fact, profit maximization
actually entails divergences from Pareto-ef f iciency which can be under-
stood only in terms of class analysis. The employer can increase the
piece of the pie accruing to capital and management by reducing the
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size of the pie to less than its maximum. Such a paradox can occur
because productive activity, in addition to creating economic goods,
shsDpes ! the consciousness of those involved. In order to maintain
forms of consciousness appropriate to capitalist social relations,
production techniques which threaten prevailing assessments of inter-
personal and interclass relations may be rejected, even though they
are technically more efficient. Thus the democratic control of pro-
duction could render members of the least-advantaged group better off
both relatively (in that certain inequalities would no longer be re-
quired to legitimize capitalist social relations) and absolutely (since
total output could probably expand with the utilization of more efficient
production techniques)
.
Let us now turn to market socialism, which conforms in all respects
to Rawls ' mixed-economy conception of capitalism, except that private
ownership of capital and wage labor are replaced by worker ownership
and democratic control of the production process. It is at least
plausible that market socialism could satisfy the principle of equal
liberty, and it should be better able than capitalism to foster the
moral development essential to widespread acceptance of Rawlsian prin-
ciples of justice. The passage from the morality of authority to the
morality of association is facilitated by the system of mutuality and
reciprocity to which workers are subjected in production. The communi-
cative experience of democratic decision-making and participatory
planning are more likely to allow individuals to identify the wants.
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needs, and desires of others. Finally, disparities in social position
are reduced by the elimination of capitalist prerogatives and the
hierarchical division of labor in the firm, thus easing the strain of
commitment to acting on the basis of Rawlsian principles.
Yet market socialism also poses obstacles to the implementation
and affirmation of the principles of justice, for it shares with
capitalism the following fundamental mechanism for attaining distribu-
tive eqity: an initial distribution of income is determined through
market forces, and redistribution to attain equity is effected through
State intervention. I shall argue that such an arrangement cannot be
expected to satisfy the Difference Principle.
The attainment of justice through redistribution requires that
particular individual interests not enter effectively in the determina-
tion of actual social policy. Yet the principle of equal liberty
requires a form of democracy in which social decisions represent in
some sense the choices of citizens. Thus justice will inevitably
require that citizens, as voters and legislator, support and affirm
policies conforming to the Difference Principle, with full knowledge
of the effect of these politicies on their own social positions.
Citizens, then, are required to legislate social justice even
when it conflicts with other moral obligations and personal concerns.
The frequency and severity of those conflicts—what Rawls calls the
"strains of commitment"—will naturally depend upon the particular
economy in question. In a class society such as capitalism, the strains
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of commitment would clearly be formidable. Even in market socialism,
'^here Rawlsian consciousness is more completely and firmly reproduced,
it is by no means clear that motivational priority for concerns of
social justice could be attained.
Rawls’ commitment to the absolute priority of socially moral duty
reflects his repudiation of classical individualism. This point is
potentially confusing. •; because Rawls does retain a methodological in-
dividualism;
The essential idea is that we want to account for
the social values, for the intrinsic good of insti-
tutional, community, and associative activities, by
a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis
is individualistic. For reason of clarity among others,
we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of com-
munity, or to suppose that society is an organic whole
with a life of its own distinct from and superior to
that of
^^1 its members in their relations with one
another.
However, Rawls reveals his intention to transcend individualism when
he adds the following:
From this (contractual) conception, however individ-
ualistic it might seem, we must eventually explain the
value of commun^^y. Otherwise the theory of justice
cannot succeed.
Later in the text, Rawls makes explicit his commitment to a
communitarian view of human nature;
It is sometimes contended that the contract doctrine en-
tails that private society is the ideal, at least when
the division of advantages satisfies a suitable standard
of reciprocity. But this is not so,... human beings have
in fact shared final ends and they value their common
institutions and activities as good in themselves. We
need one another as partners in ways of life that are
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in for their own sake, and the successes
and enjoyments of others are necessary for the
complementary to our own good. ^
If Rawls is indeed a communitarian, we may legitimately ask
why he devotes the first third of his book to deriving the principles
of justice from the original position construction before making
any appeals to intuitive or a prioristic notions of altruism, fra-
tornity
,
or community
. He seems to believe that he can strengthen
his position by employing only "widely accepted but weak premises"^^
about human nature and society. Every person is assumed to want to
maximize his index of primary goods, and persons are assumed to be
"mutually disinterested" ;"they are conceived as not taking an interest
52in one another's interests".
These premises would appear to be totally consistent with the
individualism of classical liberalism. Even Rawls' principle of
equal liberties does not appear to conflict with the tenets of clas-
sical liberalism. He denies that one conception of the good, one
dominant end, can be shown to be the appropiate end for all persons.
However, Rawls departs fromclassical individualism in asserting that
life plans are social and can best be pursued in voluntary associations.
Humans only gain liberty or autonomy by acknowledging and acting on
principles of justice;
a person is acting autonomously when the principles of
his action are chosen by him as the most adequate ex-
pressi^^ of his nature as a free and equal rational
being.
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By adopting a Kantian perspective, Rawls makes morality the ex-
pression and mutual recognition of a common human nature rather than a
servant or device of selfish interest. This respresertps a sharp break
with classical individualist doctrines of political and social ties
founded in the psychology of rational egoism. Indeed, at the end of
his book, Rawls acknowledges that;
The original position is first used to determine the
content of justice, the principles which define it.
Not until later is justice seen as part of our, good
and connected with our natural sociability. The
merits of the idea of the original position cannot
be assessed by focusing on some single feature of
it, but.^^only by the whole theory which is built
upon it.
Is this a plausible method? Can Rawls, on one hand, have people
choosing principles of justice "solely on the basis of what seems
best calculated to further their interests so far as they can ascertain
them,"^^ and, on the other hand, derive from these consequentialist
calculations two deontological principles of justice? Initially, it
would appear that he succeeds by employing Kant’s argument that a
person's interest in achieving freedom and self-realization dictates
that his actions not reflect his contingent status or desires. Rather,
one expresses human nature (i.e., Kant's noumenal self) by acting as
a 'free and equal rational being'. Thus Rawls concludes that "we
deliberately assume the limitations of the original position. .. to give
, N ..56
expression to (our) nature.
Yet Rawls is hardly a pale reflection of Kant. Indeed, sophisti-
cated liberal political philosophy has long given up the attempt to
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ground political obligation in the moral rectitude of isolated pre-
social individuals. In Rawls this rejection is reflected in his
recurrent concern with congruence, reciprocity, and experiential
reinforcement in the validation of the principles of justice through
social intercourse. The social nature of consciousness in Rawls gives
evidence of his deep commitment to the communitarian tradition in
liberal theory which considers individual consciousness and behavior
more a result thap a cause of social organization and tends to view
the State as the ultimate regulator of social development. The first
and perhaps most brilliant adherent to this view was Marx's teacher,
Hegel.
Hegel's advance over Kant was to perceive that by accepting the
ends of mutually disinterested individuals as ultimate and inviolate,
liberal theory constrained itself to viewing "civil society" as the
only conceivable form of social union, thus failing to provide a moral
basis for community. Rejecting Kant's individualism, Hegel made the
individual's relation to the State determinate of his moral identity.
Political society would achieve the community of which civil society
was incapable.
Now Rawls fully accepts the Hegelian critique of civil society, or
as Rawls calls it, "private society," which is an association "not held
together by a public conviction that its basic arrangements are just
and good in themselves, but by the calculation of everyone. .. that any
practical changes would reduce the stock of means whereby they pursue
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their personal ends."^^ Private society could not be a just society
because it lacks universally agreed upon principles of justice.
Rawls merely amplifies the growing receptiveness of liberal thought
to the Hegelian notion of the State. In the face of social conflict
engendered by capitalist development, and because, conceptually, there
was no way of demonstrating precisely which moral principles a "free
and equal rational person" would choose, liberal social theory has
quietly ushered in the interventionist State as an antidote to the
chaos of private society. Rawls* commitment to democracy, however,
will not permit him to embrace the monarchical predilections of Hegel-
ianism, wherein the State requires no participation by the governed.
Hence we witness a developing polarity in Rawls* thought as he
seeks a stable synthesis of two positions, each of which he finds
unacceptable. On one hand, modern liberal societies have shown them-
selves unable to rely solely on individual moral choice to achieve
social justice. Yet individual liberties and authentic democracy
become meaningless in the absence of individual moral responsibility.
On the other hand, the preservation of individual liberties and
democracy, not to mention social equity, in liberal societies has
required State intervention on an increasingly wider scale. Yet liberal
theory has been unable to either fully legitimize or propose definitive
guidelines for the activities of the State.
Rawls claims to have developed a consistent and stable juxtaposition
of these two dilemmas, resolving both of them by means of his methodo-
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logical construct, the Original Position. With it, he has seemingly
derived the Hegelian conclusion that the interventionist State is the
only basis for a rational society while using only the premises of
classical liberalism (that is, the individual choices of "free and
equal rational persons")
. Conversely, the Original Position frees
Hegelianism of its anti—individualistic implications by providing
explicit policy guidelines for the State and lending to its activities
the moral weight of the unanimous consensus of objective and rational
individuals
.
I maintain, however, that Rawls' synthesis does not hold and that
a sound intellectual edifice cannot be constructed by leaning Kant
against Hegel. The fundamental weakness of Rawls' theory stems from
his attempt to integrate two radically different and equally untenable
conceptions of human nature. Classical liberalism views the individual
as pursuing only private interests and tolerant of social institutions
only to the extent that they enhance the fulfillment of those interests.
Although widely divergent in substance, both the Kantian and the utili-
tarian traditions within liberal thought share the view of the isolated
individual as choosing how best to fulfill his private ends. Social
cohesion is presumed to follow either from the universality of the
imperatives of practial reason in the of Kant or from the Invisible
Hand" logic or notions of sympathy in Utilitarian doctrine.
The Hegelian conception of human nature, and with it the modern
corporate liberal tradtion, on the other hand places no reliance on
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individual moral choice since the common citizen cannot have the concept
of the social totality required to make rational choice. Only the
State can act rationally, and individuals can best assure their own
allegiance to the State. In other words, one
can behave morally only to the extent that one recognizes and acts
from one's position as a member of the social body.
That the Hegelian conception of human nature is a part of Rawls’
analysis is shown by his concern with congruence and the reinforcement
of the principles of justice in daily life. Rawls would seem to
hold that a failure on the part of the State to actively impose the
Difference Principle would cause disruption in the generation of
ideals and aspirations consistent with the principles of justice.
But this could be true only if the individual's capacity for moral
behavior is dependent on the quality of his social environment— the
Hegelian position.
I now come to the crux of my argument. Can Rawls' Original Posi-
tion actually accommodate and synthesize the polar opposites repre-
sented by Kantian and Hegelian ethics? One the one hand is the
individual's ability to act justly through the isolated exercise of
free will abstracted from social contingencies. On the other is
his ability to so identify his good with that of society as to conform
to principles of justice which may sharply interfere with the fulfill-
ment of other personal goals and obligations. Can he do both? I
claim that neither conception is plausible and that the assertion.
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upon which the coherency of Rawls’ theory depends, that both concep
tions simultaneously describe human nature is inconceivable. Rawls
has ascribed material existence to the limiting cases of moral be-
havior and even his theoretical elegance cannot withstand such a
fundamental error.
IV
In this final section, I shall address myself to three questions
concerning the implications of Rawls’ failure to construct a viable
liberal theory of justice. First, is a consistent and viable liberal
theory of justice possible? I shall argue that it is not. Second, can
any theory of justice be both internally consistent and yet viable in
a modern society? I shall support an affirmative answer, and that
answer leads directly to the third question; what would be the central
features of a just society?
Rawls’ lack of success was, in a sense, dictated by the very
nature of the task he set for himself. By acknowledging that a private
society cannot be just, Rawls forces himself to defend the position that
a liberal society can offer a sense of totality and purpose sufficiently
compelling to cause individuals to suppress their private intentions and
goals. Yet an essential aspect of liberalism is the notion of a plural good,
as evidenced by Rawls’ sharp and adamant distinction between liberal society
and societies dedicated to a dominant end or common vision of the good life.
Thus Rawls is left with the rather difficult task of arguing that individ-
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uals can reach a consensus on what constitutes justice in the distri-
bution of means (i.e., primary goods) without sharing a common valu-
ation of ends. While we might reject the viability of such a procedure
as requiring loftily virtuous decision-making behavior by the partici-
pants, Rawls does present arguments to support his case.
We have already assessed Rawls’ reliance on the Kantian moral im-
perative and found it to be inadequate as the sole basis for a theory
of justice. However, let us accept, for the sake of argument, Rawls’
claim that moral persons would act within the constraints imposed by
the Original Position. We are still left with the question of whether
or not a liberal society can engender and affirm the sort of communi-
tarian ethic which underlies Rawls’ conception of morality. To answer
this question we must examine his notion of self-respect.
Rawls defines self-respect as a "person’s sense of his own value,
his secure conviction that his life plan is worth carrying out" and
"a confidence in one’s own ability so far as it is within one’s power,
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to fulfill one’s intentions." The conditions which support self-re-
spect are: 1) the plan of life satisfies the Aristotelian Principle;
"other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities) and this en-
joyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater
its complexity. 2) Others confirm our sense of worth by their ap-
preciation of our abilities and achievements. This latter condition
is met when others are willing to join with us in the pursuit of at
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least one activity central to the realization of our life plan.^°
Such a voluntary association Rawls calls a social union.
The examples Rawls gives of social unions are families and friend-
ships, sciences and arts. Yet he seemingly ignores the fundamental
importance of the structure of work in shaping values. In liberal
societies, most gainful employments do not requir.eor permit the reali-
zation of Aristotelian capacities. They are undertaken for the sake
of compensation rather than for the sake of the activity itself. If
economic activities do not take on the character of social unions, we
must question the ability of liberal societies to foster self-respect.
Rawls anticipates this concern, and he meets it with the notion of a
"well-ordered society." In such a society, the principles of justice
are generally acknoweldged and the basic institutions are known to
satisfy the principles of justice. Indeed, a well-ordered society is
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"a social union of social unions^" in the sense that social unions,
including a generalized community of the whole, are likely to flourish
and abound.
Now Rawls has captured a certain truth which had been pushed to
the periphery by the individualist tendencies of liberal thought. He
shows that autonomy requires community, that the nature of human self-
realization requires not only that communitarian activity be a valued
end but also that private ends be affirmed by others. Yet I want to
suggest a degree of incompatibility between Rawls’ communitarian ethics
and the value he places on autonomy.
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To the extent that the individuals composing a society share values,
an objective standard is erected by which to assess preferred ends.
Rawls employs the Aristotelian principle as his objective standard, but
this strategy would seemingly lead to the conclusion that those whose
life plans exhibit little dedication to the realization of their human
capacities (as defined by societal standards) would suffer a loss of esteem
form their peers and a consequent inability to maintain adequate self-
respect. Rawls struggles to avoid this implication. He insists that
human values are pluralistic as well as communitarian. Pluralism permits
autonomous choice, diversity, and a kind of Millian progess through the
competition and testing of alternatives.
Yet even Rawls* ideal of pluralistic communitarianism remains in-
compatible with his vision of individual autonomy. A plurality of ends,
even in the context of tolerance, carries with it the likelihood that
in a society which values the Aristotelian principle, those persons whose
ends reflect a weak commitment to self-realization will be excluded from
6 3
the broad endeavors aimed at realizing societal goals. Ironically,
these same people will likely experience a more severe loss of self-
respect than if they were the pure egoists of classical liberalism. The
very presence of a communitarian ethic in a liberal society intensifies
the potential for exclusion and hence threatens the autonomy of the indi-
vidual .
To return, then, to the question of whether or not a viable liberal
theory of justice is possible, we have seen that Rawls is unable to fully
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synthesize individual autonomy and the notion of a communitarian ethic.
Without this synthesis, a liberal theory of justice faces an irresolvable
dilemma; either the criterion of right is based on the intentions of
autonomous individuals (in which case the theory of justice is totally
contingent and hence nonviable)^^ or the criterion of right is based
on an objective, or intersubjective, standard (in which case the notion
of a plural good would be undermined and rule by a benevolent despot would
be justified). Thus the theory is either nonviable or illiberal.
We must now ask whether any viable theory of justice can be conceived.
I propose that such a theory would have to begin with the recognition that
humans are both the initiators and the products of their social environ-
ment. To look to the structure of society for a criterion of right is to
miss the on-going input of human intentions. On the other hand, if we
look to individuals for the criterion of right, we miss the societal logic
which functions to structure individual evaluations and aspirations.
Rawls* fundamental error lies in the fact that, in spite of his aware-
ness of the dialectic between individual and society, he reduces both indi-
vidual intentionality and the social environment to idealized, ahistorical
abstractions. Thus he makes the human reflective capacity motivationally
dominant over all other human capacities and needs. Similarly, in arguing
that the commitment to justice would be nurtured by the functioning of
just institutions, he gives the socialization process a greater priority
than it could possibly have in a class-divided society. A correct pro-
cedure for constructing a theory of justice cannot begin by viewing autonomy
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as the private selection of personal goals and then seek, to graft a
communitarian ethic onto an individualist model. The weakness of this
approach is refMcted in the fact that, except for the "constitution-
making" stage, the Rawlsian model neither requires nor permits partici-
pation by individuals in the shaping of just institutions. Like Locke,
Smith, and Mill, Rawls lends potential support to an authoritarian State
while attempting to protect individual autonomy.
At the very base of a viable theory of justice must lie a concep-
tion of human lives as centering around voluntarily undertaken communi-
tarian activities. The value of autonomy must be transformed into the
value of participation in the formulation of a common plan for the social
units with which the individual is associated. The participation model
of autonomy would involve willingness to collaborate, compromise, and
be outvoted. It would imply that we can only discover or construct our
ends in community.
The obvious objection to this notion of autonomy is the traditional
liberal fear that the individual will be swallowed up in a social purpose
which, by its very nature, cannot be real. For the liberal viewpoint, a
social purpose can only be the individual purposes of those who have
gained power. Thus to be engulfed by a social purpose is to be subservient
to the will of other persons. This line of thinking leads Rawls to his
adamant rejection of "dominant end" societies. Yet the contradiction
between individualism and collectivism can be effectively transcended.
Habermas has developed the notion of a "communicative ethics" which;
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— guarantees the generality of admissible norms and
the autonomy of acting subjects solely through the
discursive redeemability of the validity claims with
which norms appear. That is, generality is guaranteed
that the only norms that may claim generality are
those on which everyone affected agrees (or would agree)
without constraint if they enter into (or were to enter
into) a process of discursive will—formation. . .Only
communicative ethics is universal. . .only communicative
ethics guarantees autonomy.”
Habermas is seeking to reformulate a central thesis of classical
liberalism the inseparability of truth and goodness. He argues that
a collective and ’rational will' can emerge when;
...reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to norma-
tive status afford validity to a common interest
ascertained without deception. The interest is common
because the constraint-free consensus permits only
what all can want; it is free of deception because
even the interpretations of needs in which each indi-
vidual must be able to recognize what he wants become
the object of discursive will-formation. The discurs-
ively formed will may be called "rational" because the
formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative
situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can
arise only through appropriately interpreted, general-
izable interests, by which I mean needs that can be
communicatively shared. The limits of a decisionistic
treatment of practical questions are overcome as soon
as argumentation is expected to test the generalizability
of interests, instead of being resigned to an impeneggable
pluralism of apparently ultimate value orientations.
If a society based on a participatory model of autonomy and a
communicative ethics would be just, we must finally ask what would be
the institutional characteristics of such a society. I suggest that
liberal theory itself has contributed a great deal to the proper con-
ception of the just society. The four major theorists examined in
the present work were all troubled by a perceived incompatibility between
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class divisions and social justice. The existence of classes inter-
feres with the process of reciprocal human interaction and the develop-
ment of shared standards. Thus I conclude that an essential aspect
of the just society would be an extension to the economic sphere of
the democratic rights now formally exhibited in the political sphere.
A thorough democratization of the economy is certainly a step which no
liberal theorist has been willing to advocate, yet by moving beyond the
perimeter of liberalism, we do not necessarily resolve the conflict be-
tween individual autonomy and communitarian ends. Unless the potential
for conflict between individual and social interests remains, the indi-
vidual can no longer be regarded as an autonomous agent carrying rights
and responsibilities. Admittedly, the absence of conflicting class
interests would greatly enhance the harmony of individual interests, but
an opposing force would also function in a democratized economy. The
fact that all aspects of the economy are subject to public choice would
remove any ’naturalness” to economic outcomes and would potentially in-
crease the conflict between individual interests. As Habermas explains;
At every level, administrative planning produces unintended
unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken
the justification potential of traditions that have been
flushed out of their nature-like course of development.
Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed,
the stabilization of validity claims can succed only
through discourse. The stirring up of cultural affairs
that are taken for granted thus furthers the politiciza-
tion of areas of life previously assigned to the private
sphere. .. Efforts of participation and the plethora of
alternative models... are indicators of this danger^^as
is the increasing number of citizens' initiatives.
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Habermas suggests that conflict in a just society could be mini-
mized through the development of "communicative competence" wherein
individuals are able to discursively justify their actions and beliefs.
Without meaning to belittle the significance of communicative competence,
I propose that any attempt to allocate resources in a complex, modern
economy on the basis of individual evaluations expressed solely through
political mechanisms can be neither just nor efficient. Individuals
would necessarily be engaged in continual assessment of the merits of
their own intentions and those of others. Consensus would be conceivable
only on the basis of an objective criterion of right. Yet given the
different dimensions of justice (i.e., merit, need, etc.), we would
expect consensus to be problemmatic even among individual committed to
’communicative competence'.
Mill left a valuable legacy in stressing the indeterminacy of the
proper end of human existence. Humans are actively engaged in becoming
as well as in being
,
and any attempt to truncate the developmental process
by establishing a fixed criterion of right cannot be consistent with
justice. Yet we need not conclude with Mill that a class society is
essential to the competitive dynamic through which superior humans
emerge. In fact, the solution to the indeterminacy problem is to
democratically establish an institutional framework which is sufficiently
flexible^ to accomodate the dynamism of changing preference structures
and yet sufficiently rigid to give outcomes which are affirmed because
they are believed to derive from just institutions (as opposed to affirm—
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ation based on a consensus of opinions concerning a specific outcome).
Rawls employs this approach when he argues that:
...the correctness of the distribution is founded on
the justice of the scheme of cooperation from which
it arises and on answering the claims of individuals
engaged in it. A distribution cannot be judged in
isolation from the system of which it is the outcome
or from what individuals have done in RQod faith in
the light of established expectations.
The point is that the just society could function largely on
the basis of institutional mechanisms so that individual virtue would
consist of affirming those institutions rather than continually asses-
sing the merit of every claim made on society. Habermas affirms this
conclusion when he acknowledges that;
The question of which sectors»should, if necessary, be
regulated through compromise or formal^^orms of action
can also be the subject of discussion.
The final balance between formal or institutionalized procedures and
the on-going, participatory input of individuals cannot be ascertained
beforehand. The just society, like the moral person, must choose the
correct path leading from a specific past to an indeterminate future.
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1. T.H. Green, Prolesemena To Ethics
, p. 174. See also pp. 166-7.
2. Henry Sidgewick, Method of Ethics
,
p. 121. See also p. 94.
3. W.S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy
, p. 85.
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, pp. 98, 104.
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,
p. 173.
6. K. Menger, Principles of Economics
,
p. 173.
7. L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics
,
p. 256. Walras did believe
that rent should accrue to the State; "it is contrary to justice that the
individual should turn to his exclusive profit the social conditions
established by the state." Economie Sociale
,
p. 201.
8. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
, p. 48.
9. K. Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy
,
p. 79.
10. J.B. Clark, Philosophy of Wealth
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,
p. v.
12. P.H. Wicksteed, An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of
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.
14. E. Barone, "The Ministry of Production in a Collectivist State,"
in Collective Economic Planning , F.A. Hayek (ed.). N. Kaldor, "Welfare
Propositions in Economics," Economic Journal , 1939, p. 549.
15. T. Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics,"
Review of Economic Studies , Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 77.
16. The exception, of course, is the Pareto superior move where no
person is made worse off and at least one person is made better off.
17. A. Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Econo-
mics," Quarterly Journal of Economics , February, 1938.
177
18. G. Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic
Theory
,
p. 141.
~
19. The most concise treatment of this issue is F.M. Bator, "The
Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization," American Economic Review,
March, 1957.
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21. D.M. Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics
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September, 1964, pp. 652-7.
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October, 1972, pp. 545-555; A. Schwartz, "Moral Neutrality and Primary
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Vol. 84. July, 1973, pp. 294-307; A. Eshete, "Contract-
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pp. 38-49.
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to Democratic Theory. Also Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States .
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an excellent bibliography, is provided by G.C. Harcourt, Some Cambridge
Controversies in the Theory of Capital .
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